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Abstract
Approval-based committee (ABC) rules are voting rules that output a fixed-size
subset of candidates, a so-called committee. ABC rules select committees based on
dichotomous preferences, i.e., a voter either approves or disapproves a candidate.
This simple type of preferences makes ABC rules widely suitable for practical use.
In this survey, we summarize the current understanding of ABC rules from the
viewpoint of computational social choice. The main focus is on axiomatic analysis,
algorithmic results, and relevant applications.
This is an early draft meant to solicit feedback. Any feedback, criticism, and
comments are very welcome. We use the following notation to signify the current
state of this survey: sections marked with  are largely complete and contain most
of the topics we want to discuss, sections marked with  are missing some important
topics and will be extended, and sections marked with  simply do not exist yet.
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2
1  Introduction
In committee elections we are given a set of candidates, a set of voters, the preferences that
each voter has over these candidates, and an integer k—the desired size of the committee
to be elected. The goal is to select—based on the voters’ preferences—a committee, that
is, a subset of exactly k candidates.
Committee election rules are useful for selecting a representative body, such as a
parliament1 [97, 177], a faculty council, or a board of a trade union. Moreover, selecting
finalists in a competition, based on preferences of judges/experts is also an instance of
committee elections. Other possible applications of committee election rules that have
been identified in the literature include finding group recommendations [143, 144, 192],
diversifying search results [194], locating public facilities [96, 192], and selecting validators
in consensus protocols, such as the blockchain [53, 60].
The model of committee elections has been studied for different types of voters’ bal-
lots. In this survey we are looking at the approval-based variant of the committee election
model, where each voter submits his or her preferences via a subset of candidates—this
subset is called the approval set of the voter. Example 1 in Section 2 illustrates the model
considered in this survey. Another interesting variant of the model of committees elec-
tions is ordinal-based, where each voter orders the candidates from the most to the least
preferred one. We will not consider ordinal-based committee elections in this survey—for
an appropriate overview of this model we refer the reader to the recent book chapter [93].
There are several arguments for using approval ballots in committee elections. Com-
pared to the ordinal-based model, providing approval-based preferences requires less cog-
nitive effort from the voters, and thus this kind of voting is more practical. Brams and
Herschbach [36] and Aragones et al. [6] discuss positive effects of using approval ballots on
voters’ participation, and Brams and Herschbach [36] further argues that using approval
ballots can reduce negative campaigning; Brams and Fishburn [34] discuss other possi-
ble positive implications of using approval ballots in political elections. In fact, approval
ballots are often used, but mostly in scientific societies and in the context of selecting a
single winner (see, e.g., [35]). Further recent experimental studies [1, 135, 136, 206] ex-
plore the possibility of using approval ballots in political elections, and their conclusions
are optimistic.
1Currently, most countries use legislatures based on political parties for electing parliaments. However,
in national-wide elections in some countries (e.g., in Belgium, Finland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Sweden) and in district elections in France and Switzerland, open-list systems are used—these systems
allow to vote for individual candidates rather than only for political parties. Similarly, countries such as
Australia and Republic of Ireland (and for some elections, India, Malta, and New Zealand) use Single
Transferable Vote, a rule which also allows to vote for individual candidates. Indeed, a few important
arguments for allowing the voters to vote for individual candidates have been raised. For example, when
voting for individual candidates, the electorate makes the selected candidates more responsible to itself
rather than to their political parties. Similarly, it allows the candidates to focus on campaigning for
the citizens’ votes rather than for gaining the influence within their parties [3, 5, 62, 65]. For a more
general, comparative analysis of different electoral systems we refer the reader to the book of Lijphart
and Grofman [139] and to a recent review by Grofman [107].
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In committee elections the submitted preferences of the voters over the candidates are
separable, and the voters cannot specify relations between candidates. For example, it is
not possible for a voter to indicate that she believes that a certain group of candidates
would particularly well work together in the elected committee or that she thinks that
some two candidates should never be elected together. We discuss several related models
that allow to deal with this kind of input information in Section 7.
The goal of this survey is to summarize the current state of the knowledge regarding
approval-based committee (ABC) elections. The survey should help the reader to under-
stand the most important (classes of) ABC rules and to answer the following questions:
(1) What are the properties of various ABC rules? What would be a good ABC rule for
a given application? (The answer to this question usually depends on types of properties
that the reader considers particularly important for her application.) (2) What are the
practical limitations of using a particular rule, and how one can deal with this limitations?
For a more general overview of approval voting we refer the reader to the book by
Laslier and Sanver [134]. Kilgour [114] (a chapter in the aforementioned book) and Kil-
gour and Marshall [115] have provided comprehensive overviews that deal specifically with
approval-based committee elections. However, since these summaries have been written,
approval-based committee elections have become subject to extensive studies within eco-
nomic, political, and computer science communities. The goal of this survey is to provide
a up-to-date summary of the state of the art. A particular focus of this survey is put on
axiomatic and algorithmic analysis; this line of work is prevalent in computational social
choice [43].
Prerequisites. We assume that the reader is familiar with basic concepts from al-
gorithms (big-O notation, polynomial- vs exponential-time algorithms, the concept
of approximation algorithms) and from computational complexity (NP-hardness, NP-
completeness, reductions).
Python implementation. This survey is closely connected with the Python library
abcvoting [129]. Most ABC rules discussed in this survey are available as Python code
and can be used, e.g., for numerical experiments. Moreover, all relevant examples in
this survey are also available in the abcvoting library, including the counterexamples from
Appendix A.
2  The Model
Let us first fix some basic notation. We write N to denote the set of non-negative integers.
For each t ∈ N, we let [t] denote the set {1, . . . , t}. For a set X , we write P(X) to denote
the powerset of X , i.e., the set of all subsets of X .
Now we can define the basic ingredients of voting: alternatives, voters, preferences,
and committees. Let C be a finite set of available candidates (or alternatives). We
4
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of the approval profile in Example 1. Each candidate
is represented by one or several boxes that appear in a single row in the figure, and that
are marked with a candidate-specific color. A voter approves those candidates whose
corresponding boxes appear above the voter. For example, voter 1 approves candidates a
and b and voter 4 approves candidates a and c.
assume that voters’ preferences are available in the form of dichotomous preferences, i.e.,
voters distinguish between alternatives they approve and those that they disapprove—
a dichotomy. Hence a voter’s preference over candidates is given by a set of approved
alternatives. Let N ⊆ N denote a finite set of voters. An approval profile is the collection
of all voters’ preferences; formally it is a function A : N → P(C). Throughout the paper,
we use n to denote the number of voters (|N |) and m to denote the number of alternatives
(|C|). Further, we write N(c) to denote the subset of voters that approve candidate c,
i.e., N(c) = {i ∈ N : c ∈ A(i)}.
Example 1. An academic society chooses a steering committee for the next time period.
Such a committee consists of four persons (k = 4) and there are seven candidates com-
peting for these positions, C = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g}. All members of the society are eligible
to vote and may provide approval ballots to indicate their preference. In total, 12 ballots
have been submitted:
A(1) : {a, b} A(2) : {a, b} A(3) : {a, b} A(4) : {a, c}
A(5) : {a, c} A(6) : {a, c} A(7) : {a, d} A(8) : {a, d}
A(9) : {b, c, f} A(10) : {e} A(11) : {f} A(12) : {g}
Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of this profile. In this figure, each column
correspond to one voter (one approval set) and each candidate appears in only one row—
each candidate is approved by the voters that appear below the boxes that represent the
candidate. Colors are used to distinguish different candidates.
Often, we are only interested in how often a specific approval set occurs in an approval
profiles and thus ignore the names (identifiers) of the voters who cast the approval ballots.
In such cases we do not specify the concrete mapping from N to approval sets but use the
following notation:
3× {a, b} 3× {a, c} 2× {a, d} 1× {b, c, f}
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1× {e} 1× {f} 1× {g}
The reader may ponder which steering committee should be selected given this approval
profile—there is certainly more than one sensible choice. In the following section, we will
see how different voting rules decide in this situation. ⊣
As we have seen in this example, committees are sets of candidates. Typically, we are
interested in committees of a specific size, which we denote by k. The input for choosing
such a committee is an election instance E = (A, k), i.e., a preference profile A and a
desired committee size k. Note that given A, we can derive N and C from this function:
N is the domain of A (viewed as a function) and—under the mild assumption that all
candidates are approved by at least one voter—C is the union of all function values, i.e.,
C =
⋃
i∈N A(i). Thus we do not mention N and C in this notation.
Let us now define the key concept of this survey: approval-based committee (ABC)
rules. An ABC rule is a voting rule for choosing committees, i.e., an ABC rule takes an
election instance as input and outputs one or more size-k subsets of candidates. We refer
to these size-k subsets as winning committees. If an ABC rules outputs more than one
committee, we say that these committees are tied.
Finally, let us introduce the concept of representation, which will be of importance
throughout the survey. Given a committee W , we say that candidate c ∈ W represents
voter i if voter i approves candidate c (i.e., c ∈ A(i)). The representation of voter i
is the number of approved candidates in the committee (i.e., |A(i) ∩W |). Our general
assumption is that voters desire a committee that grants them a high representation.
3  Dramatis Personae: ABC Rules
We now present the main characters in this survey: approval-based committee rules, short:
ABC rules. The goal of this section is to provide an overview of important ABC rules,
in particular those with desirable properties. For readers who are less interested in this
overview, we have marked the most relevant ABC rules with a bar on the side of the page;
one can largely follow the survey with knowledge only about these rules.
Some of the ABC rules defined in the following are resolute, i.e., return always a single
winning committee, and some are irresolute. Most rules can be defined either way; we
have chosen the more natural definition for each rule.
For the following definitions, we assume that we are given an election instance E =
(A, k) for a voter set N and a candidate set C.
3.1 Thiele Methods
In the single-winner setting, i.e., if k = 1, there is only one reasonable voting rule when
presented with approval ballots: Approval Voting. Approval Voting selects those alterna-
tives that are approved by the maximum number of voters, all of which are (co-)winners
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according to this rule. Most ABC rules introduced in this section are equivalent to Ap-
proval Voting for the case k = 1 (we discuss notable exceptions in Section 3.6). There is,
however, one ABC rule that extends the reasoning of Approval Voting to k > 1 in the
most natural manner; this rule is therefore called Multi-Winner Approval Voting (short:
AV).2
Rule 1 (Multi-Winner Approval Voting, AV). This ABC rule selects the k candidates
which are approved by most voters. Formally, the AV-score of an alternative c ∈ C is
defined as scAV(A, c) = |{v ∈ N : c ∈ A(v)}| and AV selects committees W that maximize
scAV(A,W ) =
∑
c∈W scAV(A, c).
Example 2. Let us consider the instance of Example 1. To compute AV, we count how
often each alternative is approved: a: 8 times, b : 4, c : 4, d : 2, e : 1, f : 2 and
g : 1. We want to select the four most-approved alternatives. As d and f both have the
fourth-most approvals, AV returns two tied committees: the sets W1 = {a, b, c, d} and
W2 = {a, b, c, f}. It is noteworthy that W1 leaves three voters completely unsatisfied with
the chosen alternatives, whereas W2 satisfies all but two. ⊣
We continue with an ABC rule that can be seen as the exact opposite of AV. Whereas
AV disregards whether some voters completely disagree with a committee, the Approval
Chamberlin–Courant rule grants as many voters as possible at least one approved al-
ternative in the committee. This rule was first mentioned by Thiele3 [203], and then
independently introduced in a more general context by Chamberlin and Courant [61].
Rule 2 (Approval Chamberlin–Courant, CC). The CC rule outputs all committees W
that maximize scCC = |{v ∈ N : A(v) ∩W 6= ∅}|.
Example 3. Consider again the instance of Example 1:
3× {a, b} 3× {a, c} 2× {a, d} 1× {b, c, f} 1× {e} 1× {f} 1× {g}.
There is exactly one committee that grants each voter (at least) one approved candidate:
W = {a, e, f, g}. While this committee indeed provides some satisfaction for every voter,
it includes alternatives (e and g) that are approved only by single voters. ⊣
The two ABC rules we discussed so far—AV and CC—can not only be seen as ex-
treme points in the spectrum of ABC rules, they also belong to the same general class of
2Let us briefly mention a few restricted forms of AV that are widely used in political settings: Block
Voting, where voters may not approve more than k candidates, Limited Voting, where voters may approve
at most s candidates with s < k, and Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV), which is Limited Voting for
s = 1. For our purposes none of these rules is of particular interest as they are all special cases of AV.
3Thorvald Nicolai Thiele (1838–1910) was a Danish astronomer and mathematician. He was professor
of astronomy at the University of Copenhagen and director of the Copenhagen University Observatory.
He is most known for his work in mathematics, in particular in statistics [137, 156, 204, 205]. The
contributions of Thiele to voting theory are discussed in detail by Janson [112].
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ABC rules. Thiele methods, a class of ABC rules introduced by Thiele in the late 19th
century [203], encompass all rules that maximize the total (the sum of) satisfaction of
voters, or, in other words, maximize the total welfare. By differing the definition of how
voters are satisfied with a given committee, a very broad spectrum of ABC rules can be
covered.
Rule 3 (Thiele methods, w-Thiele4). A Thiele method is parameterized by a non-
decreasing function w : N → R with w(0) = 0. The score of a committee W given a
profile A is defined as
scw(A,W ) =
∑
i∈N
w (|W ∩ A(i)|) ;
the w-Thiele method returns committees with maximum score.
Indeed, AV is the w-Thiele method with w(x) = x; CC is the w-Thiele method with
w(x) = min(1, x). This follows immediately from the respective definitions. The following
Thiele method is arguably one of the most important: Proportional Approval Voting, in
short PAV. Also this rule was defined in Thiele’s original paper [203]. The definition (and
properties) of PAV crucially depend on the harmonic function.
Rule 4 (Proportional Approval Voting, PAV). Let h(x) =
∑x
i=1
1/i denote the harmonic
function. PAV is h-Thiele, i.e., it is the w-Thiele with with w(x) = h(x). In other words,
PAV assigns to each committeeW the PAV-score scPAV(A,W ) =
∑
i∈N h (|W ∩ A(i)|) and
returns all committees with maximum score.
By using the harmonic function h(·), we introduce a flattening satisfaction function
for voters, akin to the law of diminishing returns. As a consequence, PAV balances the
(justified) demands of large groups with the conflicting goal of satisfying small groups.
Indeed, as we will see in Section 5, Proportional Approval Voting achieves this balance
in a proportional fashion. Figure 2 shows a visualization of the defining w-functions of
different Thiele methods:
wAV(x) = x wPAV =
x∑
i=1
1/i wCC =
{
0 if x = 0,
1 if x ≥ 1.
Note that also visually the function defining PAV is “in between” AV and CC.
Example 4. Given the instance of Example 1:
3× {a, b} 3× {a, c} 2× {a, d} 1× {b, c, f} 1× {e} 1× {f} 1× {g},
PAV selects the committee W = {a, b, c, f}. For one voter ({b, c, f}) this committee
contains three approved alternatives, for 6 voters this committee contains two approved
4The class of Thiele methods is sometimes also referred to as weighted PAV rules [14]; we prefer the
term Thiele methods as only few rules in this class are actually proportional. Kilgour and Marshall [115]
refer to this class as generalized approval procedures.
8
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
2
4
6
8
number of approved candidates in committee (x)
sa
ti
sf
ac
ti
on
w
(x
)
CC
PAV
AV
Figure 2: Defining w-functions for three Thiele methods: Multi-winner Approval Voting
(AV), Proportional Approval Voting (PAV), and Approval Chamberlin–Courant (CC).
alternatives, for three voters W contains one approved alternative, and two voters are not
at all satisfied with W . Thus, we have scPAV(A,W ) = (1+1/2+1/3)+7·(1+1/2)+3·1 = 83/6
and this value is optimal. Coincidentally, W is one of the two committees produced by
AV, namely the one with fewer dissatisfied voters. It appears that PAV strives for a
compromise between AV and CC—this is an intuition that we will discuss in more detail
later (Section 5.5). ⊣
Other Thiele methods that have been studied in the literature are the class of p-
Geometric rules [192], threshold procedures [98, 115], and Sainte-Lague¨ Approval Voting
(SLAV) [128].
Thiele methods pick committees that maximize a certain welfare of the voters, thus,
they belong to a broader class of welfarist rules.
Definition 1. A welfare vector induced by a committee W specifies for each voter, her
satisfaction from W (measured as the number of candidates she approves in W ):
welf(W ) = (|A(1) ∩W |, |A(2) ∩W |, . . . , |A(n) ∩W |).
An ABC rule R is welfarist if there is a function f : NN → R, mapping welfare vectors
to scores, such that for each instance (A, k) we have
R(A, k) = argmaxW⊆C : |W |=kf(welf(W )).
In this definition, f(welf(W )) can be viewed as the welfare that voters gain from W .
For Thiele methods, the welfare of voters is the sum of the satisfaction of voters (deter-
mined by the w-function). For the class of welfarist rules, also types of aggregations other
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than the sum can be used. For example, one can define f(welf(W )) as the satisfaction
of the least-satisfied voter—akin to egalitarian aggregation [154]. Another example of a
welfarist rule is a dictatorial rule which compares welfare vectors lexicographically given
a fixed order of voters: the first voter in this order is a dictator and only if the dictator
is indifferent between two outcomes, the second-in-place may decide.
These other types of aggregations have been studied in the context of committee
elections with ranking based preferences (for the egalitarian aggregation see [16, 191]; for
the OWA-based aggregation see [81]). For approval ballots, we are aware only of two
works that consider such aggregations. Computation properties of CC an Monroe rules
based on the egalitarian aggregation are considered by Betzler et al. [29]. Amanatidis
et al. [2] consider OWA-based aggregation, but for other types of welfare of individual
voters—we will discuss that in more detail in Section 3.6.
3.2 Sequential Variants of Thiele Methods
Thiele methods are defined as optimization routines: given an objective function, they
return all committees that maximize this function. We define two classes of sequential
procedures: sequential and reverse sequential Thiele methods. Both classes have been
introduced in Thiele’s original paper [203] (see Janson’s survey for further historical re-
marks [112]). Furthermore, both classes can be seen as approximation algorithms for
Thiele methods; we return to this analogy in Section 6.1.2.
Let us begin with sequential Thiele methods: starting with an empty committee, they
add committee members one by one, in each step the one that increases the objective
function the most.
Rule 5 (Sequential w-Thiele, seq-w-Thiele). For each w-Thiele method, we define its
sequential variant, seq-w-Thiele, as follows. We start with an empty committee W0 = ∅.
In each round r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we compute Wr = Wr−1 ∪ {c}, where c is a candidate that
maximizes scw(A,Wr−1 ∪{c}), i.e., the candidate that improves the committee’s score the
most. If more than one candidate yields a maximum score, we break ties according to
some given tie-breaking order. The seq-w-Thiele rule returns Wk.
Two sequential Thiele methods will be of particular interest in this survey: sequential
wPAV-Thiele and sequential wCC-Thiele. We refer to these two rules as seq-PAV and seq-
CC. In contrast, the sequential variant of AV (seq-wAV-Thiele) is not relevant to us as it
is equivalent to AV. This is because the AV-score (scAV) of candidates is not influenced
by the other candidates in the committee.
Example 5. Since the instance of Example 1 yields the same result for PAV and seq-PAV
(and also for CC and seq-CC), we take a look at a different profile:
3× {a, b} 6× {a, d} 4× {b} 5× {c} 5× {c, d}
For k = 2, PAV selects the committee {a, c} with a PAV-score of 19. (Each voter except
those that approve only candidate b has exactly one approved candidate in the committee.)
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Let us contrast this result with seq-PAV. All sequential Thiele methods with w(1) > 0,
including seq-PAV, select the candidate with the largest number of approvals in the first
round—the winner according to (single-winner) Approval Voting. Thus, d is selected in
the first round as it gives an AV-score of 11. In the second round, we choose between a
(increasing the score by 6) and b (increasing the score by 7) and c (increasing the score
by 7.5). Hence, seq-PAV returns the committee {c, d} with a PAV-score of 18.5. ⊣
Similar to sequential Thiele methods, reverse sequential Thiele methods build com-
mittees sequentially, but here one starts with the set of all candidates and sequentially
removes the candidate that contributes the least to the committee’s score.
Rule 6 (Sequential w-Thiele, rev-seq-w-Thiele). For each w-Thiele method, we define
its reverse sequential variant, rev-seq-w-Thiele, as follows. We start with Wm = C, the
set of all candidates. Each round, the candidate with the least marginal contribution the
score is removed. To be precise, in each round r from m − 1 down to k, we compute
Wr = Wr+1 \ {c}, where c is a candidate that maximizes scw(A,Wr+1 \ {c}), i.e., the
candidate whose removal decreases the committee’s score the least. If more than one
candidate does that, we break ties according to some given tie-breaking order. The rev-
seq-w-Thiele rule returns Wk.
In the remainder of the survey, we will only encounter reverse sequential PAV (rev-
seq-PAV).
Example 5 (continued). For rev-seq-PAV, we start with the full set of candidates W4 =
{a, b, c, d} and remove the candidate with the least marginal contribution: removing a
decreases the score by 4.5, removing b decreases the score by 5.5, c by 7.5, ad d by 6.5.
This, a is removed andW3 = {b, c, d}. Now, we again compute the marginal contributions:
for b 7, for c 7.5, and for d 8.5. Thus, W2 = {c, d}, which is the winning committee. We
see that for this instance seq-PAV and rev-seq-PAV yield the same winning committee.
This does not hold in general.
An election instance where PAV, seq-PAV, and rev-seq-PAV all yield different winning
committees can be found in Janson’s survey [112, Example 13.3]. The example is due to
Thiele [203] and significantly larger than the examples presented here (9,321 voters). ⊣
3.3 Monroe’s Rule
Monroe’s rule [152] is an ABC rule5 related to the Chamberlin–Courant rule. It also aims
at maximizing the number of voters who are represented in the elected committee. The
main difference is that each committee member can represent at most 1/k-th of the voters.
5Although Monroe defined his rule in the original paper primarily for linear preference orders [152],
he considered the modified version based on approval ballots the “most promising option” for actual
(political) use. If the distinction between these two rules is necessary, the approval-based version is often
denoted as α-Monroe; we do not need this distinction in this survey as we focus solely on approval ballots.
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Figure 3: An optimal Monroe assignment for Example 6: the top row shows the assigned
representative for each voter. For example, the assigned representative of voter 1 is b;
voter 12 is dissatisfied with her assigned representative e.
Rule 7 (Monroe). Given a committee W , a Monroe assignment for W is a function
φ : N → W such that each candidate c ∈ W is assigned roughly the same number of
voters, i.e., for all c ∈ W it holds that ⌊n/k⌋ ≤ |φ−1(c)| ≤ ⌈n/k⌉. The candidate φ(i) can
be viewed as the representative of voter i. Let Φ(W ) be the set of all possible Monroe
assignments for W . The Monroe-score of a committee W is defined as the number of
voters that have a representative assigned that they approve (given an optimal Monroe
assignment), i.e., scMonroe(A,W ) = maxφ∈Φ(W ) |{i ∈ N : φ(i) ∈ A(i)}|. Monroe returns
all committees with a maximum Monroe score.
Example 6. Considering Example 1:
3× {a, b} 3× {a, c} 2× {a, d} 1× {b, c, f} 1× {e} 1× {f} 1× {g},
we first note that the desired committee size k = 4 divides the number of voters n = 12
and hence a Monroe assignment assigns exactly 3 voters to each candidate. One optimal
Monroe assignment (among many) is shown in Figure 3 and given by φ−1(a) = {3, 7, 8},
φ−1(b) = {1, 2, 9}, φ−1(c) = {4, 5, 6}, φ−1(e) = {10, 11, 12}. The Monroe score of this
assignment is scMonroe(A,W ) = 10, since only voters 11 and 12 are assigned to a repre-
sentative (candidate e) that they do not approve. In total there are six winning committees;
committee {a, b, c, e} is one of them. ⊣
Monroe’s rule has also a natural sequential version, called Greedy Monroe6, introduced
by Skowron et al. [191]. We present Greedy Monroe here in a slightly simpler, more
practical fashion, where dissatisfied voters are not assigned to groups.
Rule 8 (Greedy Monroe). This ABC rule proceeds in k rounds: In each round r ∈
{1, . . . , k} Greedy Monroe assigns a candidate to a group of voters Gr of size at most
nr (defined below); this candidate is added to the committee. The maximum size of a
group, nr, is defined as follows: if n = k · ⌊n/k⌋ + c, then n1 = · · · = nc = ⌈n/k⌉ and
nc+1 = · · · = nk = ⌊n/k⌋. In round r + 1, let Nr+1 denote the voters that have not yet
6Greedy Monroe is called Algorithm A in the original paper [191] and is defined therein only for
instances where k divides n. The first general definition was given in [84].
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an assigned committee member, i.e., Nr+1 = N \ (G1 ∪ · · · ∪ Gr). Candidate cr+1 is
chosen as a candidate that maximizes |{i ∈ Nr+1 : c ∈ A(i)}| (using a tiebreaking order
on candidates if necessary). Now, if there are at most nr+1 not yet assigned voters that
approve cr+1, then Gr+1 = {i ∈ Nr+1 : cr+1 ∈ A(i)}; if there are more than nr+1 such
voters, a tiebreaking order on voters is used to assign exactly nr+1 voters to Gr+1. Greedy
Monroe outputs the committee {c1, . . . , ck}.
Example 7. In our running example (Example 1) given by
3× {a, b} 3× {a, c} 2× {a, d} 1× {b, c, f} 1× {e} 1× {f} 1× {g},
Greedy Monroe first picks candidate a as it is approved by most voters. We assume that ties
among voters are broken in increasing order, so G1 = {1, 2, 3}. Now c is chosen since it is
the only candidate with 4 supporters among the remaining voters (N2 = {4, . . . , 12}). The
corresponding group of voters is G2 = {4, 5, 6} (again choosing voters with smaller index
first). Now there are two candidates left that are approved by two voters in the remaining
set (N3 = {7, . . . , 12}): candidates d and f . By alphabetic tiebreaking we choose d, and
so we set G3 = {7, 8}. Finally, there is one candidate that has two supporting voters
in N4 = {9, . . . , 12}: f is approved by voters 9 and 11; thus G4 = {9, 11}. A Monroe
assignment corresponding to this committee {a, c, d, f} is, e.g., given by φ−1(a) = {1, 2, 3},
φ−1(c) = {4, 5, 6}, φ−1(d) = {7, 8, 10}, and φ−1(f) = {9, 11, 12}. In this instance, Greedy
Monroe was able to find a committee with a maximum Monroe score, but this does not
hold in general. ⊣
3.4 Phragme´n’s Rules
Phragme´n7 introduced a number of voting rules, most of which are based on a form of
cost-sharing (or load balancing). The core idea is that placing a candidate in the winning
committee incurs a cost, or load, that has to be shouldered by voters that approve this
candidate. The goal is to choose a committee that allows for an as equal as possible
distribution of its cost. In this way, the preferences of as many voters as possible are
taken into account.
The most interesting rule invented by Phragme´n is Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule [166–
168]. Although a variant of this rule exists that is based on global optimization (compa-
rable to Thiele methods), the sequential rule exhibits overall much better properties, in
particular regarding proportionality axioms. This is in contrast to Thiele methods, for
which their sequential counterparts are arguably inferior. We will return to these claims
and the corresponding axiomatic analysis in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
7Lars Edvard Phragme´n (1863–1937) [58, 112, 157, 198] was a Swedish mathematician and an actuary.
He was a professor of mathematics at Stockholm University and life-long editor of Acta Mathematica.
His best known mathematical work is the Phragme´n-Lindelo¨f principle in complex analysis [170], but he
also published several works on election methods [165–169] and was involved in Swedish electoral reforms;
see Janson’s survey [112] for a comprehensive summary of his work on election methods.
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Even though Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule can be considered one of the more appealing
ABC rules, this rule remained unknown to many social choice researchers until recently.
Few publications before 2017 mention Phragme´n’s methods; notable exceptions are a
survey by Janson [111] (in Swedish) and a paper by Mora and Oliver [153] (in Catalan).
Since 2017 several papers have proven Phragme´n’s method to be a particularly strong
ABC rule, in particular being a proportional ABC rule that is both polynomial-time
computable and committee monotone (see Section 4.3 for details).
We present two (equivalent) formulations of seq-Phragme´n. The first is conceptually
simpler, while the second gives a clearer picture how the rule is computed in practice.
Rule 9. [Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule, seq-Phragme´n] This ABC rule is based on the
assumption that placing a candidate in the winning committee incurs a load (or cost)
of 1, which is distributed to the set of voters that approve this candidate.
Continuous formulation: We assume that each voter has a budget which constitutes his
or her voting power. Voters start with a budget of 0 and this budget continuously
increases as time advances. At time t, the budget of each voter is t. As soon as
a group of voters that jointly approve a candidate has a total budget of 1, the joint
candidate is added to the winning committee. Then the budget of all involved voters
is reset to 0; only voters that do not approve the selected candidate keep their current
budget. This process continues until the committee is filled. If at some point two
candidates could be moved in the committee at the same time, a tie-breaking order
is used to decide which candidate is selected.
Discrete formulation: seq-Phragme´n works in rounds; each round one candidate is added
to the committee. Let yr(v) denote the load assigned to (or cost contributed by)
voter v after round r ≤ k. We naturally start with y0(v) = 0. Let {c1, . . . , cr−1}
be the candidates added to the committee in rounds 1 to r − 1. To determine the
next candidate cr to add, we compute for each candidate c ∈ C \ {c1, . . . , cr−1} the
maximum load that would arise from adding cr:
ℓr(c) =
1 +
∑
v∈N(c) yr−1(v)
|N(c)|
;
the load of voters in N(c) would increase to this amount if c was added to the
committee. Note that the load is distributed so that all voters approving c end up
with the same load; this is so to minimize the maximum load. Now, to keep the
maximum load as small as possible, seq-Phragme´n chooses the candidate c with a
minimum ℓr(c), i.e.,
cr = argmin
c∈C\{c1,...,cr−1}
ℓr(c).
If two or more candidates yield the same maximum load, a tie-breaking method is
required (typically some fixed order on C). After choosing cr, the voter loads are
14
adapted accordingly:
yr(v) =
{
ℓr(cr) if v ∈ N(cr),
yr−1(v) if v /∈ N(cr).
The rule returns the winning committee {c1, . . . , ck}.
To see that these two formulations are equivalent, note that for a winning committee
W = {c1, . . . , ck} (selected in this order) the maximum loads in each round ℓr(cr) directly
corresponds to the points at which sufficient budget was available to pay for cr. From this
point of view, the discrete formulation is only the explicit calculation of the time points
at which sufficient budget is available to place a new candidate in the committee.
Example 8. Let us again consider our running example (Example 1):
3× {a, b} 3× {a, c} 2× {a, d} 1× {b, c, f} 1× {e} 1× {f} 1× {g}.
We use the continuous formulation to describe the method, but it is easy to repeat the cal-
culations using the discrete formulation. Figure 4 shows a visualization of the procedure,
which we will now explain step by step. The first time sufficient budget is available to
move a candidate into the committee is at time t1 = 1/8. At this point, voters {1, . . . , 8}
can jointly pay for candidate a. Now the budget of voters 1 to 8 is reset to 0; the remaining
voters have a budget of 1/8.
A second candidate can be added to the committee at time t2 = 11/32. Voters 4, 5, 6, 9
approve candidate c; their respective budgets are (7/32, 7/32, 7/32, 11/32) (note that voters 4,
5, and 6 have a budget that is 1/8 less than that of voter 9).
The third candidate, b, is added at time t3 = 55/128. At this point, voters 1, 2, and 3
have a budget of 39/128, and voter 9 has a budget of 11/128; that’s in total 1. Note that these
numbers follow from the fact that voters 1–3 already paid 1/8 for selecting candidate a and
voter 9 paid 11/32 for selecting candidate c.
Finally, at time t4 = 5/8 the last candidate, d, is added to the committee. At this point,
the two voters approving d (voters 7 and 8) have budget of 5/8− 1/8 = 1/2, in total 1. Thus,
seq-Phragme´n returns the committee {a, b, c, d}. When repeating this calculation using the
discrete formulation, one obtains the final loads y4 = (t3, t3, t3, t2, t2, t2, t4, t4, t3, 0, 0, 0). ⊣
As mentioned earlier, there are also optimization-based analogues of seq-Phragme´n.
We will discuss the most notable optimization-based method: lexmin-Phragme´n8 [49, 112,
168].
8Phragme´n discusses optimization variants of his rule in [168] and proposes to minimize the maximum
load (see [112]); this rule could be called min-Phragme´n. Brill et al. [49] show that it is more sensible
to use a lexicographic comparison of loads instead of only considering the maximum load. We thus only
discuss lexmin-Phragme´n (referred to as opt-Phragme´n in [49]). Further optimization variants exist, such
as minimizing the variance of loads [49, 112, 168].
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Figure 4: A visualization of seq-Phragme´n (upper part) applied to the election instance
of Example 1 (lower part). In the upper part all regions of the same color (corresponding
to the same candidate) have an area of 1, which is the budget spent on this candidate.
Rule 10 (Phragme´n’s Lexmin Rule, lexmin-Phragme´n). Each candidate in the committee
incurs a load (or cost) of 1 which has to be distributed to voters approving this candidate.
Given a committee W = {c1, . . . , ck}, a valid load distribution forW is a function ℓ : W×
N → [0, 1] which satisfies (1) if ℓ(c, i) > 0 then voter i approves c, and (2)
∑
i∈N ℓ(c, i) = 1
for all c ∈ W . Let ℓ(c) =
∑
i∈N ℓ(c, i).
To compare two (valid) load distributions, we use a lexicographic order. Let W =
{c1, . . . , ck} and W
′ = {c′1, . . . , c
′
k} be two committees and let ℓ and ℓ
′ be valid load distri-
bution for W and W ′, respectively. Let x be the sorted k-tuple (starting with the largest
entry) of (ℓ(c1), . . . , ℓ(ck)), and let x
′ be the sorted k-tuple (starting with the largest entry)
of (ℓ′(c′1), . . . , ℓ
′(c′k)). We say that x is lexicographically smaller than x
′ if there exists an
index j ≤ k such that y1 = x
′
1, y2 = x
′
2, . . ., yj = x
′
j, and yj+1 < x
′
j+1.
Let ℓ(W ) denote the lexicographically smallest valid load distribution for committeeW .
Then, lexmin-Phragme´n returns all committees W for which ℓ(W ) is lexicographically
minimal in the set {ℓ(W ′) : W ′ ⊆ C and |W ′| = k}.
Example 9. When considering our running example, we will see that lexmin-Phragme´n
behaves differently than seq-Phragme´n. When looking for a committee that has the lexi-
cographically smallest load distribution, we find committee W = {a, b, c, f} with ℓ(W ) =
(3/8, 3/8, 3/8, 3/8, 3/8, 3/8, 3/8, 3/8, 1/2, 0, 1/2, 0). This load distribution is depicted in Figure 5.
CommitteeW is the only winning committee; for example, committeeW ′ = {a, b, c, d} (the
winning committee of seq-Phragme´n) has ℓ(W ′) = (3/7, 3/7, 3/7, 3/7, 3/7, 3/7, 1/2, 1/2, 3/7, 0, 0, 0),
which is lexicographically larger. ⊣
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Figure 5: A visualization of lexmin-Phragme´n (upper part) applied to the election instance
of Example 1 (lower part). In the upper part all regions of the same color (corresponding
to the same candidate) have an area of 1, which is the budget spent on this candidate.
3.5 Phragme´n-like Rules
We now discuss a very recent addition to the zoo of ABC rules, dubbed Rule X [164].
This rule can be viewed as a variant of seq-Phragme´n, where the voters are given some
budget upfront, rather than receiving it continuously. We include this rule in our survey
as it is polynomial-time computable and even surpasses the proportionality guarantees of
seq-Phragme´n.
Rule 11 (Rule X). The rule proceeds in two phases. The first phase consists of at most
k rounds; in each round one candidate is added to the committee. In the second phase the
committee is completed in one of several possible ways.
For the first phase, we assume each voter is initially given a budget of k/n. Let xr(i)
denote the budget of voter i after round r; thus x0(i) = k/n. As with seq-Phragme´n, putting
a candidate in the committee incurs a cost of 1. In each round r + 1, we consider the
set of candidates that have not yet been placed in the committee and whose supporters
can afford to pay for them, i.e., the candidates c such that
∑
i∈N(c) xr(i) ≥ 1. Let this
set be Cr ⊆ C. If Cr is empty, then we conclude the first phase and move to phase two.
Otherwise, for each candidate c ∈ Cr we ask what is the minimal budget ρ(c) such that
each voter approving c pays at most ρ(c) and all voters who approve c pay 1 in total, i.e.,
what is the minimal value ρ(c) that satisfies:∑
i∈N(c)
min(ρ(c), xr(i)) = 1.
(Such a ρ(c) always exists, since otherwise c would not be contained in Cr.) We select the
candidate c that minimizes ρ(c) (using some fixed tiebreaking if necessary), and reduce the
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budget of voters who approve c accordingly—for each i ∈ N we set
xr+1(i) =


xi(r)− ρ(c) if c ∈ A(i) and xi(r) ≥ ρ(c),
0 if c ∈ A(i) and xi(r) < ρ(c),
xi(r) if c /∈ A(i),
i.e., voters who approves c either pay ρ(c) or their remaining budget.
The second phase is only relevant if fewer than k have been put in the committee
W so far. If |W | < k, we add have to add k − |W | additional candidates in W . Many
properties of Rule X do not depend on the specific way in which these k−|W | candidates are
selected.9A concrete and recommendable way to fill the committee is to use seq-Phragme´n
but with initial budgets defined in the following fashion: We set the starting budget of each
voter to their budget after the first phase of the Rule X. To be more concrete, assume phase
one ends with round r′. In the discrete formulation of seq-Phragme´n the starting loads
are y0(i) = k/n − xr′(i). Then seq-Phragme´n proceeds as usual until to desired committee
size is reached.
Example 10. Consider once again our running example. Each voter is initially given a
budget of 4/12 = 1/3. In the first round candidate a is selected and each of the first 8 voters
pays 1/8 for it. In the second round, C2 = ∅ since no candidate has sufficiently endowed
voters. For example, the amount of money that the voters who approve b have in total is
3 · (1/3 − 1/8) + 1/3 < 1 and thus insufficient to pay for b. This ends the first phase of the
rule.
In the second phase, the voters start receiving additional budget. Voters 1 to 8 start
with a budget of 1/3 − 1/8; voters 9 to 12 start with a budget of 1/3. At time t2 = 1/96 the
voters who approve b have enough money to pay for including b. Indeed:
3 · (1/3− 1/8) + 1/3+ 4t2 = 1.
The same is true for the voters who approve c. Let us assume that we resolve the tie in
favor of b: b is selected and the voters 1, 2, 3 and 9 are left without budget. Next, at time
t3 = 3/32 candidate c is selected. Finally, at time t4 = 7/24 we select d. Committee W =
{a, b, c, d} is the only winning committee. In this example, Rule X returns the same
committee as seq-Phragme´n. ⊣
Since in Example 10 only one candidate is selected in the first phase of Rule X, we
provide one additional example which better illustrates this phase of the rule.
Example 11. Consider the following approval profile given by
11× {a, b, c} 9× {a, b, c, d, e} 4× {a, b, d, e} 6× {d, e},
9An exception is the priceability axiom, see Section 5.3; this axiom is dependent on how to extend the
committee to its full size. The proposed completion via seq-Phragme´n fulfills priceability.
18
a
b
c
d
e
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29
d
a
b
c
1/24
1/24
1/20
Figure 6: A visualization of Rule X (upper part) applied to the election instance of
Example 11 (lower part). In the upper part all regions of the same color (corresponding
to the same candidate) have an area of 1, which is the budget spent on this candidate.
which is illustrated in the lower part of Figure 6. The goal is to select a committee of size
k = 4. Thus, voters start with a budget of 4/30.
In this example, candidates a and b are selected in the first two rounds, and each of
the first 24 voters pays two times 1/24 for these two candidates. Candidate c is selected in
the third round; each of the first 20 voters pays 1/20 for c, and after the third round these
voters are left with no budget (indeed, 1/24 + 1/24 + 1/20 = 4/30). In the fourth round d or
e is selected (we assume it is d by tiebreaking). Voters 21–24 pay 1/20 for d; the voters
25–30 pay 4/30. The payments of the voters for the particular candidates are depicted in
the upper part of Figure 6. Since four candidates are selected in the first phase of Rule
X, there is no second phase.
In this example, either committee {a, b, c, d} or {a, b, c, e} are winning according to
Rule X (depending on tiebreaking). In contrast, seq-Phragme´n would pick {a, b, d, e}. ⊣
We mention three further rules that are related to Phragme´n’s rules. The first is the
Expanding Approvals Rule [10]. This rule is defined for weak order preferences and has
favorable axiomatic properties in this setting. It is less convincing for purely dichotomous
preferences10 and thus we do not consider it further. The second rule is the maximin
support method [181], which is similar to seq-Phragme´n. It is an iterative rule based on
a form of load balancing, but in contrast to seq-Phragme´n all loads can be redistributed
each round. A first analysis showed that the maximin support method and seq-Phragme´n
share many axiomatic properties [181]; it remains an open question which of the two
rules is preferable. We focus in this survey on seq-Phragme´n as it is better studied and
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conceptually simpler.
Finally, Phragme´n also introduced a method now referred to as either Phragme´n’s first
method, Enestro¨m’s method, or method of Enestro¨m–Phragme´n11 [56, 87, 112]. We do not
discuss this rule in this survey, even though it is a sensible rule. Indeed, it can be viewed as
an analogue of STV with approval ballots. However, its main downside compared to seq-
Phragme´n is that it is not committee monotone (cf. Section 4.3) and satisfies only weaker
proportionality requirements than Rule X (e.g., it fails EJR as defined in Section 5.2).
3.6 Non-Standard ABC Rules
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, most ABC rules coincide with (single-
winner) Approval Voting for k = 1. If we understand an approval ballot as indicating those
alternatives that a voter likes, then for k = 1 it is indeed very natural to select the most-
approved alternative. Thus, we refer to rules that differ from Approval Voting for k = 1
as non-standard ABC rules. We present two such rules. The first one, Minimax Approval
Voting (MAV) introduced by Brams, Kilgour, and Sanver [38], interprets approval ballots
as the voter’s exact description of the desired outcome. If a voter approves a set X ,
then she indicates that all these alternatives should be chosen; any sub- or superset is
suboptimal. In addition, MAV is an egalitarian rule in the sense that it only pays attention
to the least-satisfied voter.
To measure the distance between an approval set and a committee, we rely on the
Hamming distance:
Definition 2. Given two sets X, Y , we define the Hamming distance between X and Y
as the size of their symmetric difference: dham(X, Y ) = |X \ Y |+ |Y \X|.
Rule 12 (Minimax Approval Voting, MAV). MAV selects committees W that
minimize the largest Hamming distance among all voters, i.e., MAV minimizes
maxi∈N dham(A(i),W ).
Example 12. To see that MAV does not correspond to Approval Voting for k = 1,
consider the following approval profile:
99× {a} 1× {b, c}.
The Hamming distance dham between the committee W1 = {a} and the approval set {b, c}
is 3. In contrast, for the committee W2 = {b} (or {c}) we have dham({b, c},W2) = 1 and
dham({a},W2) = 2. Thus, MAV selects either b or c, even though these alternatives are
approved by only a single voter. ⊣
10For example, in profiles where no candidate reaches a specified quota and every voter approves only
one candidate, the Expanding Approvals Rule selects an arbitrary committee and thus ignores the voters’
preferences.
11It is not completely clear whether Phragme´n or Gustaf Enestro¨m (1852–1923) should be credited
with this method. However, it appears to be justifiable to simply credit both of them; see the historical
summary provided by Janson [112, Footnote 38].
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Remark 1. It is interesting to note that if we replace the max operator in the definition
of MAV by a sum, we obtain the Multi-Winner Approval Voting rule (Rule 1).
Remark 2. MAV, as defined, has a major shortcoming. Consider the following slight
modification of Example 12:
99× {a} 1× {a, b, c},
For all size-1 committees, the Hamming distance to {a, b, c} is 2. Hence, all three com-
mittees are equally preferable according to MAV—even though candidate a is approved by
every voter (and b and c by only one voter). We see that MAV might disregard a unani-
mous choice. This problem can be remedied by also considering the second-least satisfied
voter in case of ties, and the third-least in case there is still a tie, and so on until a differ-
ence between the committees is found. More formally, for each committee W , we compute
dham(A(1),W ), dham(A(2),W ), . . . and sort this tuple of length |N | in decreasing order;
we denote this tuple of distances DW . Instead of considering only the first entry in these
tuples, we could lexicographically sort them. That is, a committee W1 is preferred to a W2
if there exists an index i ≤ n such that DW1(i) < DW2(i) and DW1(j) = DW2(j) for all
1 ≤ j < i. In our example, we have D{a} = (2, 0, 0, . . . ) and D{b} = D{c} = (2, 2, 2, . . . );
with this modification {a} is the only winning committee. To the best of our knowledge
this modification of MAV has not been studied in the context of voting. However, it is
equivalent to the Gmax belief merging operator for Hamming distance [118].
The second non-standard rule is Satisfaction Approval Voting12 (SAV). SAV is a vari-
ation of AV where each voter has one point and distributes it evenly among all approved
candidates.
Rule 13 (Satisfaction Approval Voting, SAV). The SAV-score of a committee W is de-
fined as
scSAV(A,W ) =
∑
v∈V
|W ∩ A(v)|
|A(v)|
.
SAV returns all committees with a maximum SAV-score.
Note that SAV is not a Thiele method since the number of approved candidates influ-
ences the SAV-score.
Example 13. To see that SAV does not correspond to Approval Voting for k = 1, consider
1× {a} 3× {b, c, d, e}.
The SAV-score of a is 1 and of b, c, d, and e it is 3/4. Thus, SAV selects {a} even though
it is approved by only one voter. ⊣
12Satisfaction Approval Voting was introduced under this name by Brams and Kilgour [37], but the
method has been discussed already in the 19th century (see Janson’s survey [112], Section E.1.5.). It is
also known as Equal and Even Cumulative Voting.
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Pareto
efficiency
committee
monoton.
support monot.
with / without
add. voters
consist.
inclusion-
strategypr.
comput.
complexity
AV strong ✓ ✓ / ✓ ✓ ✓ P
CC weak × ✓ / cand ✓ ? NP-hard
PAV strong × ✓ / cand ✓ × NP-hard
seq-PAV × ✓ ≥cand / cand × × P
seq-CC × ✓ ? / ? × × P
rev-seq-PAV × ✓ ≥cand / cand × × P
Monroe × × × / cand × × NP-hard
Greedy Monroe × × × / ? × × P
seq-Phragme´n × ✓ cand / cand × × P
lexmin-Phragme´n × × cand / cand × ? NP-hard
Rule X ? × × / ? × × P
MAV weak × ? / ? × × NP-hard
SAV strong ✓ ✓ / ✓ ✓ × P
Table 1: Basic properties of ABC rules
Finally, let us note that rev-seq-PAV, introduced in Section 3.2, is also a non-standard
method.
Example 14. To see that rev-seq-PAV is a non-standard method, consider, e.g.,
1× {a, b} 1× {a, b, c} 1× {a, b, d} 2× {a, c, d} 1× {b} 1× {c} 1× {d}.
In the first round, the marginal contribution of a is 1/2+ 4 · 1/3; the marginal contribution
from the other candidates is at least 2. Thus, candidate a is removed in the first round,
even though it has the highest approval score. ⊣
4  Basic Properties of ABC Rules
In the previous section we have seen a wide array of ABC rules. Considering how much
they differ in their definitions, it can be expected that they differ also in the properties
they exhibit. In this section we consider basic properties of ABC rules. These properties
describe the behavior of such rules and offer insights into the nature of specific ABC rules.
Table 1 offers an overview of most properties discussed in this section.
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4.1 Anonymity, Neutrality, and Resoluteness
Anonymity and Neutrality are two of the most basic properties in the social choice liter-
ate [7, 146, 154]. Anonymity states that the identity of voters should not influence the
outcome: it should be irrelevant whether voter i approves A(i) and voter j approves A(j)
or vice versa. Formally, an ABC rule R satisfies anonymity if for all election instances
(A, k) with voter set N and bijections π : N → N it holds that R(A, k) = R(A ◦ π, k). It
is easy to see that all rules introduced in Section 3 satisfy anonymity. A typical example
of a voting rule that fails anonymity is any dictatorial rule (a rule considering only the
preferences of a single distinguished voter, e.g., of voter 1).
Neutrality is the counterpart to anonymity but applies to candidates: it states that
all candidates should be treated equally. Formally, an ABC rule R satisfies neutrality if
for all election instances (A, k) with candidate set C and bijections π : C → C it holds
that R(A, k) = R(π∗ ◦ A, k), where π∗ is the natural extension of π to a bijection from
P(C) to P(C) defined by π∗(X) = {π(c) : c ∈ X} for each X ⊆ C. The rules that fail
neutrality are usually those that require some form of tiebreaking.
Anonymity and neutrality together are often called symmetry.
The third, equally fundamental property we want to discuss here is resoluteness. An
ABC rule is resolute if it always returns exactly one winning committee. An ABC rule
can either be resolute or neutral, but not both. To see this, consider an approval profile
where all voters approve candidates {a, b} and k = 1: either a rule returns two winning
committees or decides in favor of one of the two candidates. Clearly, any rule can be
made resolute by imposing a tiebreaking between winning committees. Conversely, if a
resolute rule is defined by a tiebreaking order over candidates (this includes all rules in
Section 3 that fail neutrality), it can be made neutral by returning all committees that
win according to some tiebreaking order. In this way, one can trade neutrality against
resoluteness.
4.2 Pareto Efficiency and Condorcet Committees
Pareto efficiency13 is a very general concept to compare two outcomes given the preferences
of individuals: outcome Y dominates outcome X if (1) every individual weakly prefers
outcome Y to X (i.e., everyone likes Y at least as much as X), and (2) there is at least
one individual that strictly prefers Y to X . Pareto efficiency, broadly speaking, means
that dominated outcomes are avoided. This concept can be directly translated to our
setting to compare committees [128]:
Definition 3. A committee W1 dominates a committee W2 if
1. every voter has at least as many representatives in W1 as in W2 (for i ∈ N it holds
that |A(i) ∩W1| ≥ |A(i) ∩W2|), and
2. there is one voter with strictly more representatives (there exists j ∈ N with |A(j)∩
W1| > |A(j) ∩W2|).
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A committee that is not dominated by any other committee (of the same size) is called
Pareto optimal.
An ABC rule R satisfies strong Pareto efficiency if R never outputs dominated com-
mittees. An ABC rule R satisfies weak Pareto efficiency if for all election instances (A, k)
it holds that if W2 ∈ R(A, k) and W1 dominates W2, then W1 ∈ R(A, k).
Table 1 shows an overview which rules satisfy Pareto efficiency (for details, in partic-
ular counterexamples, see [128]). It may be surprising that rather few ABC rules satisfy
Pareto efficiency even though this is considered a basic property in other settings (or even
a minimal requirement). Indeed, among the rules introduced in Section 3 only Thiele
rules and MAV satisfy weak Pareto efficiency [128], and among those only AV, PAV, and
SAV satisfy strong Pareto efficiency (Proposition A.1).
To see an example how a rule may fail Pareto efficiency, it is instructive to consider
Monroe’s rule:
Example 15 (from [128]). Consider the approval profile
2× {a} 1× {a, c} 1× {a, d} 10× {b, c} 10× {b, d}
For k = 2, Monroe selects {c, d} as the (only) winning committee with a Monroe-score of
22. Committee {c, d} is however dominated by {a, b}: everyone of the 24 voters has one
representative in {a, b} but only 22 voters have a representative in {c, d}. Thus, every
voter is either equally satisfied or better off with committee {a, b}. This example shows
that Pareto efficiency clashes with Monroe’s goal to assign representatives to groups of
similar size. ⊣
One may wonder whether it is sensible to improve an ABC rule R that is not Pareto
efficient in the following way: given an election instance E, if W ∈ R(E) is dominated by
another committee, then instead output all Pareto optimal committees that dominate W .
There are two main objections against this idea: First, this modification may destroy other
axiomatic properties (e.g., perfect representation, as discussed in Section 5.3, and Pareto
efficiency are incompatible). Second, finding Pareto improvements is a computationally
hard task:
Theorem 1 ([11, Theorem 2]). Given an election instance (A, k) and committee W , it is
coNP-complete to determine whether W is Pareto optimal.
As a consequence of Theorem 1, we cannot expect to obtain polynomial-time com-
putable, Pareto efficient ABC rules by modifying existing rules as described above. Note,
however, that polynomial-time computable, Pareto efficient ABC rules exist, e.g., AV and
SAV. Thus, finding a Pareto optimal committee is possible in polynomial-time.
A related property to Pareto efficiency has been proposed by Darmann [71]: a commit-
tee W is a Condorcet committee if for every other committee W ′, for a majority of voters
13Named after Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), an Italian economist [4, 80].
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V ⊆ N it holds that |A(i)∩W | > |A(i)∩W ′| for i ∈ V . Similarly to Theorem 1, deciding
whether a given committee W is a Condorcet committee is coNP-complete. However, in
contrast to Pareto optimality, it is also coNP-complete to decide whether a Condorcet
committee exists [71]. To the best of our knowledge, it has not been analyzed which ABC
rules output a Condorcet committees if it exists.
4.3 Committee Monotonicity
Committee monotonicity (also referred to as house monotonicity) is property that is highly
desirable in some settings: if the committee size k is increased to k + 1, then a winning
committee of size k should be a subset of a winning committee of size k + 1. Since this
property is particularly useful for resolute rules, we define it exclusively for resolute rules.
Appropriate definitions for irresolute rules (called upward- and downward-accretive) can
be found in [115].
Definition 4. A resolute ABC rule R is committee monotone if for all election instances
(A, k) it holds that W ⊆ W ′, where W is the single winning committee in R(A, k), and
W ′ is the single winning committee in R(A, k + 1).
To see why committee monotonicity can be an essential requirement in applications,
consider the following situation: a group can jointly acquire k items and uses an ABC
rule to fairly select those. Once these k items are ordered, it turns out that one additional
item can be afforded. If the used ABC rule is committee monotone, it is clear which item
to acquire next. If the rule, however, is not committee monotone, then the selection for
k + 1 items might include none of the already ordered items, a useless recommendation.
Another example is a hiring process where it is not determined up-front how many
candidates are to be hired. Here it is useful that a committee monotone rule actually
produces a ranking of candidates: which one should be hired if only one position is
available, which one if a second position is to be filled, etc. This connection between
committee monotone ABC rules and rankings has been explored in-depth by Skowron
et al. [194].
Table 1 shows which of the considered rules are committee monotone, assuming that
these rules are made resolute by fixing a tiebreaking order among candidates. AV, seq-
PAV, seq-CC, rev-seq-PAV, seq-Phragme´n, and SAV are committee monotone; this follows
immediately from their corresponding definitions. Counterexamples for the remaining
rules can be found in Appendix A, Proposition A.2.
4.4 Candidate and Support Monotonicity
Candidate monotonicity deals with a seemingly obvious requirement: if the support of a
candidate increases (i.e., more voters approve this candidate), then this cannot harm the
candidate’s inclusion in a winning committee. However, this property is not satisfied by
some ABC rules, in particular, if we demand such a monotonicity to hold also for groups
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of candidates. In addition, there is a difference whether an existing voter changes her
ballot, or if a new voter enters the election.
Candidate monotonicity axioms for ABC rules have been considered in a number of
papers [10, 112, 127], but the paper by Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez and Fisteus [180] should be
highlighted for the most in-depth analysis.
We use the following notation: For a profile A and candidate set X ⊆ C, we write
Ai+X to denote the profile A with voter i additionally approving the candidates in X , i.e.,
Ai+X = (A(1), . . . , A(i−1), A(i)∪X,A(i+1), . . . , A(n)). Further, we write A+X to denote
the profile A with one additional voter approving X , i.e., A+X = (A(1), . . . , A(n), X).
Definition 5 ([180]). An ABC rule R satisfies support monotonicity without additional
voters if for any election instance (A, k), i ∈ N , and candidate set X ⊆ C it holds that
1. if X ⊆W for all W ∈ R(A, k), then X ⊆ W ′ for all W ′ ∈ R(Ai+X , k), and
2. if X ⊆W for some W ∈ R(A, k), then X ⊆W ′ for some W ′ ∈ R(Ai+X , k).
An ABC rule R satisfies support monotonicity with additional voters if for any elec-
tion instance (A, k) and candidate set X ⊆ C the properties above hold for A+X instead
of Ai+X .
If an ABC rule satisfies these axioms only for singleton sets (X = {c}), we speak of
candidate monotonicity with/without additional voters.14
The analysis of ABC rules with respect to these axioms is mostly due to Janson [112],
Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez and Fisteus [180], Mora and Oliver [153]. We summarize the results
in Table 1 with one column for support monotonicity with additional voters and one
with additional voters. There, the symbol ✓ means that support monotonicity is satis-
fied, cand means that candidate monotonicity is satisfied but not support monotonicity,
≥cand means that candidate monotonicity is satisfied and it is unclear whether support
monotonicity is satisfied, × means that the rule fails even candidate monotonicity, and a
question mark means that we do not know. Detailed counterexamples related to support
monotonicity can be found in Proposition A.3 in the appendix.
4.5 Consistency
Consistency is an axiom describing whether a rule behaves consistently with respect to
disjoint groups: if the outcome of an election is the same for two disjoint groups, then
a voting rule should arrive at this outcome also if these two groups are joined into a
single electorate. This axiom is a straightforward adaption of consistency as defined for
single-winner rules by Smith [196] and Young [209] and was first discussed in the context
of ABC rules by Lackner and Skowron [126].
14These properties are implied by weak support monotonicity with/without population increase as
defined by Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez and Fisteus [180].
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Definition 6. An ABC rule R satisfies consistency if for every k ≥ 1 and two profiles
A : N → P(C) and A′ : N ′ → P(C) with N ∩ N ′ = ∅, if R(A, k) ∩ R(A′, k) 6= ∅ then
R(A + A′, k) = R(A, k) ∩ R(A′, k).
Monroe’s rule, for example, does not satisfy consistency:
Example 16. Let profile A be
A(1) : {a, y} A(2) : {a, y} A(3) : {b, y} A(4) : {b, y}
and profile A′ be
A(5) : {y} A(6) : {a} A(7) = A(8) = A(9) = A(10) : {a, x}
A(11) : {y} A(12) : {b, y} A(13) = A(14) = A(15) = A(16) : {b, x}
For k = 2, Monroe returns for profile A the winning committees {a, b}, {a, y}, and {b, y},
all of which with a Monroe-score of 4. For profile A′, Monroe returns the winning commit-
tee {a, b}, with a Monroe-score of 10; the corresponding Monroe assignment groups voters
5–10 and 11–16. Now, let us consider the profile A + A′. Consistency would demand
that {a, b} is the unique winning committee, as it is the only committee winning in both
A and A′. Committee {a, b} has a Monroe-score of 14 in A + A′. This score, however,
is not optimal: {x, y} has a Monroe-score of 15; the corresponding Monroe assignment
groups voters {1, . . . , 6, 11, 12} and {7, . . . , 10, 13, . . . , 16}. Thus, {a, b} is not winning
and consistency is violated. ⊣
Broadly speaking, the only rules satisfying consistency are so-called ABC scoring
rules [126]. These are defined similarly to Thiele methods but are more general, as
the satisfaction of voter may depend on the number of candidates approved by this voter:
Definition 7. A scoring function is a function f : N×N → R satisfying f(x, y) ≥ f(x′, y)
for x ≥ x′. Given such a scoring function, we define the score of W in A as
scf (A,W ) =
∑
v∈V
f(|A(v) ∩W |, |A(v)|).
The ABC scoring rule defined by a scoring function f returns all committees with maxi-
mum score.
By definition, each Thiele method is an ABC scoring rule, whereas SAV is an example
of an ABC scoring rule that is not a Thiele method. Further, it follows immediately from
the definition of welfarist rules (Definition 1) that an ABC scoring rule is welfarist if and
only if it is a Thiele method.
Lackner and Skowron [126] axiomatically characterized the class of ABC scoring rules.
This characterization is in a slightly different model than the one we use in this survey:
the characterization applies to ABC ranking rules instead of ABC rules (as defined in this
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survey). ABC ranking rules output a weak order over committees (a ranking with ties over
committees) instead of just distinguishing between winning and losing committees (as we
assume here). Note, however, every ABC ranking rule defines an ABC rule (top-ranked
committees are winning).
The following characterization uses two axioms we have not mentioned so far: weak
efficiency and continuity. Both are rather weak, technical axioms. Intuitively, weak
efficiency requires that approved candidates are preferable to non-approved candidates,
and continuity states that a sufficiently large majority can force a committee to win.
Theorem 2 ([126]). An ABC ranking rule is an ABC scoring rule if and only if it satisfies
anonymity, neutrality, consistency, weak efficiency, and continuity.
As both weak efficiency and continuity are generally satisfied by sensible voting rules,
one can conclude that ABC scoring rules essentially capture the class of consistent ABC
ranking rules15 (see [126] for a more detailed discussion and exact definitions of the ax-
ioms).
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first axiomatic characterization of
ABC rules. In Section 5.1, we will discuss how this result can be used to obtain further
axiomatic characterizations, e.g., of PAV.
4.6 Strategic Voting
Strategic voting is a phenomenon central to social choice theory. Sometimes, it is prefer-
able for voters to misrepresent their preferences to change the outcome of an election;
this is often referred to as “manipulation”. The famous impossibility theorem by Gibbard
[104] and Satterthwaite [184], showing that all “reasonable” single-winner voting rules
are susceptible to manipulation, is considered one of the main results in the field. The
Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem applies to elections where voters provide linear rankings
over alternatives. As our approval-based setting uses a much more restricted form of
preferences, strategyproofness is not completely out of the picture.
We are going to consider two forms of strategyproofness here: Cardinality-
strategyproofness and inclusion-strategyproofness (taken from [161], see [102, 201]
for more general discussions of strategyproofness in social choice). Cardinality-
strategyproofness assumes that voters are concerned only about the number of ap-
proved candidates in the committee (and do not distinguish them), whereas inclusion-
strategyproofness assumes that voters may have more complex preferences so a successful
manipulation must produce a committee including all approved candidates that were
already included in the original committee.
To clarify what it means that a voter misrepresents their true preferences, we use the
concept of i-variants: Given profiles A and A′, both with the same set of voters N , we
15In the setting of single-winner rules a similar result holds: a social welfare function is a scoring rule
if and only if it satisfies anonymity, neutrality, consistency, and continuity, as shown by Smith [196] and
Young [209].
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say that A′ is an i-variant of A if A(j) = A′(j) for all j ∈ N \ {i} with j 6= i. Let us first
define both notions for resolute ABC rules.
Definition 8. A resolute ABC rule R satisfies cardinality-strategyproofness if for all
profiles A and A′ where A′ is an i-variant of A and k ≥ 1 it holds that |R(A, k)∩A(i)| ≥
|R(A′, k) ∩ A(i)|.
Definition 9. A resolute ABC rule R satisfies inclusion-strategyproofness if for all pro-
files A and A′ where A′ is an i-variant of A and k ≥ 1 it holds that R(A, k) ∩ A(i) 6⊂
R(A′, k) ∩A(i).
Inclusion-strategyproofness is a weaker notion than cardinality-strategyproofness,
since fewer committees count as a successful manipulation, i.e., successful manipulations
are harder to achieve.
Both axioms can be generalized to irresolute ABC rules via a set extension, i.e.,
by defining how voters compare sets of committees. A natural extension is the Kelly
(or cautious) extension: a voter prefers R(A′, k) to R(A, k) if every committee in
R(A′, k) is preferable to every committee in R(A, k). A more substantial discussion
of strategyproofness of irresolute rules can be found in the paper of Kluiving et al.
[117]. Moreover, Lackner and Skowron [127] propose a rather strong strategyproofness
axiom (SD-strategyproofness) that applies to irresolute rules and implies cardinality-
strategyproofness.
Among the rules considered in this paper, only AV satisfies any of the mentioned
strategyproofness axioms, namely both inclusion-strategyproofness and cardinality-
strategyproofness (see A.4 for counterexamples). Furthermore, AV also satisfies SD-
strategyproofness and can even be characterized in the class of ABC scoring rules (as
defined in Section 4.5) as the only rule satisfying SD-strategyproofness [127]. We note,
however, that under more holistic models, e.g., models where voters have underlying non-
dichotomous preferences, AV is no longer strategyproof (see, e.g., [72, 136, 148, 187]).
Recently, Scheuerman et al. [185] have conducted a behavioral experiment in which they
analyzed how the voters vote under non-dichotomous preferences, when they are uncertain
about other voters’ preferences, and when AV is used to select the winning candidates.
These results suggest that the voters may use different (sometimes suboptimal) heuristics
when making decisions which candidates they should approve.
We further discuss strategyproofness in Section 5.6 in the context of proportionality.
We will see that even weakest forms of proportionality are incompatible with strate-
gyproofness.
Finally, we mention that Amanatidis et al. [2] have considered a different variant of
strategy-proofness, where each voter cares not only about the number of representatives
in the elected committee, but also about the number of non-elected candidates that she
does not approve.
29
4.7 Computational Complexity
As a last basic property of ABC rules, we want to discuss their computational complex-
ity. That is, in short: how computationally expensive is it to find a winning committee
according to a given ABC rule? Here, we distinguish only two types of complexity: ABC
rules that are computationally easy, i.e., computable in polynomial time, and ABC rules
that are computationally expensive, i.e., those that are NP-hard. This is only a coarse
dichotomy; we will discuss computational issues in more detail in Section 6.
Let us first consider the class of Thiele methods. Out of the three most prominent
Thiele methods, two are NP-hard (CC and PAV) and one is computable in polynomial
time (AV). A polynomial-time algorithm for AV is straight-forward: for each alternative c
we compute its approval score scAV(A, c) = |{v ∈ N : c ∈ A(v)}| and select the k
alternatives with the largest scores. To be able to claim NP-hardness of an ABC rule R,
we have to fix a decision problem; we choose the following for rules based on scores: given
an approval profile, is there a committee with R-score at least s? The NP-hardness of
CC has been shown by Procaccia et al. [173]; the NP-hardness of PAV by Skowron et al.
[192] and Aziz et al. [13] (for a different decision problem). A more general result [192,
Theorem 5] shows which Thiele methods are NP-hard:
Theorem 3. Let w : N → R be a non-increasing function for which w(i) > w(i+ 1) for
some i ∈ N. Given an approval profile profile A, a committee size k, and a bound s, it is
NP-hard to decide whether there exists a committee of size k with a w-score of at least s,
i.e., scw(A,W ) ≥ s.
This theorem includes all Thiele methods except for AV, and thus AV is the only
polynomial-time computable Thiele method.
Sequential and reverse sequential Thiele methods can be computed in polynomial time;
this follows immediately from their definitions. The same holds for Greedy Monroe, seq-
Phragme´n, Rule X, and SAV. In contrast, appropriate decisions problems for Monroe’s
rule [173], minimax-Phragme´n [49], and MAV [138] are NP-hard. Further, these prob-
lems belong to NP. Indeed, computing the score of a given committee W according to
minimax-Phragme´n and MAV is straightforward. For Monroe’s rule this is less obvious:
a polynomial-time algorithm based on a reduction to the min-cost max-flow problem has
been suggested by Procaccia et al. [173]. It works as follows: We build a graph with a
single source s, and a single sink t. For each member of the given committee c ∈ W , we
add a vertex and connect it to s via an edge with cost 0, capacity ⌈n/k⌉ and flow require-
ment of at least ⌊n/k⌋. For each voter i ∈ N , we add a vertex and connect it to t with
an edge with cost 0 and capacity 1. Finally, we connect each candidate c and each voter
i with an edge of capacity 1; if c ∈ A(i) we set the cost of this edge to 1, otherwise we
set it to 0. In such constructed graph we seek a min-cost flow of n units from s to t; the
units of the optimal flow from the candidates to the voters give an optimal assignments.
To conclude, the complexity classification discussed here should not be misunderstood
in implying that NP-hard ABC rules are impractical and should be avoided. There is a
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wide range of algorithmic techniques available to solve NP-hard problems, and many disci-
plines in computer science encounter (and routinely solve) computationally hard problems.
Instead the message here is the following: When using a polynomial-time computable
rule, even very large instances can be expected to be solved quickly. For NP-hard rules,
a more thorough analysis is necessary to determine how large instances can be solved. In
Section 6.1, we discuss algorithmic techniques for computing NP-hard ABC rules.
4.8 Open Problems
We conclude this section by stating several interesting open problems.
1. We mentioned in Section 4.1 that ABC rules that require tiebreaking do not satisfy
neutrality (e.g., sequential and reverse sequential Thiele methods, Greedy Monroe,
seq-Phragme´n, and Rule X). These rules can be made neutral with parallel universes
tiebreaking [48, 66, 100]: a committee is winning under the neutral variant if and only
if it is winning for some tiebreaking order under the original rule. This modification
will have an algorithmic impact (trying all permutations of candidates would require
exponential time), but the exact computational complexity of these neutral rules
is not settled. Further, under which conditions can these rules be computed in
polynomial time?
2. From Table 1, we can see that for some axioms and some ABC rules we still do not
know whether a given rule satisfies the axiom or not. Filling these gaps would help
us obtain a more complete picture of the differences between particular ABC rules.
3. In Section 4.7, we presented a coarse analysis of the computational complexity of
ABC rules. This analysis could be refined by considering the Candidate Winner
problem: given an election instance (A, k) and a candidate c, does there exist a
winning committee W that contains c. This problem has recently be shown to be
Θp2-complete for Monroe and CC. A similar analysis for other computationally hard
voting rules is missing.
5  Proportionality
A key difference among ABC rules is how they treat minorities of voters, i.e., small
groups with preferences different from larger groups. Let us illustrate this issue through
the following simple example.
Example 17. Consider the approval-based preference profile with 60 voters approving
A = {a1, . . . , a10}, 20 voters approving B = {b1, . . . , b6}, 10 voters approving C = {c1, c2},
8 voter approving D = {d1, d2, d3, d4}, and 2 voters who approve E = {e1, e2, e3}; assume
our goal is to pick a committee of ten candidates. Given this instance AV returns com-
mittee A, and in some cases this is a reasonable choice (e.g., when the goal of the election
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proportionality
degree
EJR PJR JR
laminar
prop.
price-
ability
apportionment
AV 0 [189] none
PAV ℓ− 1 [15] X [14] X [14] X [14] D’Hondt [50]
seq-PAV
≈ 0.7ℓ− 1
(for k ≤ 200) [189]
D’Hondt [50]
rev-seq-PAV ? D’Hondt [50]
CC ≤ 1 (Ex. 22) X [14] none
seq-CC ≤ 1 (Ex. 22) X [14] none
seq-Phragme´n (ℓ−1)/2 [189] X [49] X [49] X [164] X [164] D’Hondt [50]
Rule X (ℓ±1)/2 (A.9) X [164] X [164] X [164] X [164] X [164] D’Hondt [164]
lexmin-Phragme´n 1 [189] X [49] X [49] X [164] D’Hondt [50]
Monroe ≤ 1 (Ex. 22) † [182] X [14] LRM† [50]
Greedy Monroe ≤ 1 (Ex. 22) † [182] X (A.7) LRM† (A.5)
MAV 0 (A.9) none
SAV 0 (A.9) none
Table 2: Proportionality of ABC rule. There are three rules which perform particularly
well in terms of proportionality: PAV, Phragme´n’s sequential rule, and Rule X. The
mark † means that the result holds only when the number of voters n is divisible by the
committee size k. References of the form (A.x) refer to propositions in Appendix A.
is to select finalists of a contest). Yet, when the goal is to select a representative body that
should reflect voters’ preferences in a proportional fashion, this committee violates very
basic principles of fairness. Indeed, the voters who approve committee A constitute 60%
of the population, yet effectively they decide about the whole committee; at the same time
the group of 20% who approve B is ignored. A committee that consists of six candidates
from A, two candidates from B, one candidate from C, and one candidate from D is, for
example, a much more proportional choice. ⊣
In Example 17, picking an outcome that is intuitively proportional is easy due to a
very specific structure of voters’ approval sets—each two approval sets are either the same
or disjoint. Finding a proportional committee in the general case, when any two approval
sets can arbitrarily overlap, is by far less straightforward, and to some extent ambiguous.
Several approaches that allow one to formally reason about proportionality have been
proposed in the literature.
The goal of this section is to review these approaches and to identify ABC rules
which can be considered proportional. Table 2 provides an overview of this analysis; the
corresponding concepts are explained in this section.
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5.1 Apportionment
One approach to reasoning about proportionality of voting rules is to first identify a class of
well-structured preference profiles where the concept of proportionality can be intuitively
captured, and then to examine the behavior of voting rules on such well-structured profiles.
We focus here on so-called party-list profiles, which are election instances of the form as
we have seen in Example 17.
Definition 10 (Party-list profiles). We say that an approval profile A = (A(1), . . . , A(n))
is a party-list profile if for each two voters i, j ∈ N we have that either A(i) = A(j) or
that A(i) ∩ A(j) = ∅. We say that an election instance (A, k) is a party-list instance if
(i) A is a party-list profile, and (ii) for each voter i ∈ N we have that |A(i)| ≥ k.
Party-list profiles closely resemble political elections with political parties, hence the
name of the domain. Indeed, if A is a party-list profile, then the sets of voters and
candidates can be divided into p disjoint groups each, N = N1 ∪ . . . ∪ Np and C ⊇
C1 ∪ . . . ∪ Cp, so that all voters from group Ni, i ∈ [p], approve exactly the candidates
from Ci (and no others). The candidates from Ci can be thought of as members of some
(virtual) party, and the voters from Ni are those who cast their single vote on party Ci
(i.e., assuming plurality ballots).
In such elections, where the voters do not vote for individual candidates but rather
each individual casts a single vote for one political party, the problem of distributing seats
to political parties is called the apportionment problem. The concept of proportionality
in the apportionment setting has been extensively studied in the literature and is well
understood—for a detailed overview we refer the reader to the comprehensive books by
Balinski and Young [19] and by Pukelsheim [175].
We see from Definition 10 that the apportionment problem can be viewed as a strict
subdomain of approval-based committee elections, and consequently ABC rules can be
viewed as functions that extend apportionment methods to the more general setting of
approval profiles. This connection was already known and referred to by Thiele [203]
and Phragme´n [167]. In a more systematic fashion, Brill et al. [50] showed such relations
between various ABC rules and methods of apportionment. To properly explain this
relation, let us first define three prominent apportionment methods, used in parliamentary
elections all over the world.
In the following, we assume that there are p political parties, consisting of the candidate
sets C1, . . . , Cp. By ni we denote the number of votes cast on party Ci. Further, recall that
k denotes the number of committee seats that we want to distribute among the parties.
Apportionment Rule 1 (D’Hondt method16). The D’Hondt method proceeds in k
rounds, in each round allocating one seat to some party. Consider round r, and let si(r)
16Victor D’Hondt (1841–1901) was a Belgian professor of law and active proponent of proportional
representation [73, 74]. The D’Hondt method is also known as Jefferson method. Thomas Jefferson
(1743–1826) was president of the United States, and proposed this method to allocate seats in the House
of Representatives to states. D’Hondt developed this method independently of Jefferson’s earlier and
largely similar proposal, and D’Hondt’s proposal was specifically meant for proportional representation
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be the number of seats that are currently assigned to party Ci; thus,
∑
i∈[p] si(r) = r − 1.
The D’Hondt method assigns the r-th seat to the party Ci with the maximal ratio
ni
si(r)+1
(using a tie-breaking order between parties if necessary).
Apportionment Rule 2 (Sainte-Lague¨17 method). The Sainte-Lague¨ method is defined
analogously, but in the r-th round it allocates the r-th seat to the party Ci which maximizes
the ratio ni
2si(r)+1
.
Apportionment Rule 3 (Largest remainder method, LRM18). The largest remainder
method first assigns to each party
⌊
k · ni
n
⌋
seats—this way at least k − p + 1 seats are
assigned. Second, it assigns the remaining r < p seats to the r parties with the largest
remainders k · ni
n
−
⌊
k · ni
n
⌋
, assigning each party at most one seat.
Example 18. Consider a party-list representation of the profile from Example 17. We
have five parties, A, B, C, D, and E, each getting, respectively, 60, 20, 10, 8, and 2 votes;
the committee size is k = 10. The computation of the D’Hondt method can be represented
through the following left table:
A B C D E
ni 60 20 10 8 2
ni/2 30 10 5 4 1
ni/3 20 6 2/3 3 1/3 2 2/3 2/3
ni/4 15 5 2 1/2 2 1/2
ni/5 12 4 2 1 3/5 2/5
ni/6 10 3 1/3 1 2/3 1 1/3 1/3
ni/7 8 4/7 2 6/7 1 3/7 1 1/7 2/7
ni/8 71/2 2 1/2 1 1/4 1 1/4
A B C D E
ni 60 20 10 8 2
ni/3 20 6 2/3 3 1/3 2 2/3 2/3
ni/5 12 4 2 1 3/5 2/5
ni/7 8 4/7 2 6/7 1 3/7 1 1/7 2/7
ni/9 6 2/3 2 2/9 1 1/9 1 8/9 2/9
ni/11 5 5/11 1 9/11 10/11 8/11 2/11
ni/13 4 8/13 1 7/13 10/13 8/13 2/13
ni/15 4 1 1/3 2/3 8/15 2/15
In the subsequent rounds the D’Hondt method allocates seats to parties A, A, A (by tie-
breaking), B, A, A, A (by tie-breaking), B (by tie-breaking), and C. For example, in the
fourth round, when A is already allocated 3 seats and B is allocated none, the rule will
give the next seat to B rather than to A, because 20
0+1
> 60
3+1
. Summarizing, 7 seats will be
allocated to party A, two seats to party B, and one seat to party C; the remaining parties
in parliaments. The name “Jefferson method” is typically used in the U.S., while “D’Hondt method” is
prevalent in Europe.
17As it is the case with the D’Hondt/Jefferson method, this rule has been developed independently
in Europe and in the U.S. and goes by different names: Sainte-Lague¨ is used in Europe (in particular
in the context of proportional representation in parliaments) and Webster is the name used in the U.S.
literature. Sainte-Lague¨ (1882–1950) was a French mathematician and proposed this method in 1910
[179]. Daniel Webster (1782–1852) was a U.S. statesman and proposed this method in 1832 [19].
18The largest remainder method is also known as Hamilton method, as it was proposed in the U.S. by
Alexander Hamilton (1755–1804). His proposal was abandoned in favor of Jefferson’s method [19].
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will get no seats. In the diction of ABC rules, winning committees are exactly those that
consist of 7 candidates from A, 2 candidates from B and one candidate from C.
The computation of the Sainte-Lague¨ method is represented through in the above right
table. It will allocate 6 seats to A, 2 seats to B, 1 seat to C, and 1 seat to D.
The largest remainder method first assigns to parties A, B, C, D, and E—
respectively—6, 2, 1, 0, and 0 seats. Then, the remainders are considered:
A B C D E
ni 60 20 10 8 2⌊
k · ni
n
⌋
6 2 1 0 0
remainder 0 0 0 0.8 0.2
seats 6 2 1 1 0
There is one unassigned seat which will be given to the party with the largest remainder,
namely to D. Thus, LRM will allocate 6 seats to A, 2 seats to B, 1 seat to C, and 1 seat
to D. ⊣
The D’Hondt method, the Sainte-Lague¨ method, and the LRM exhibit particularly
appealing properties. For example, the D’Hondt method satisfies lower quota, which
means that a party i which receives ni out of n votes must be allocated at least ⌊k · ni/n⌋
committee seats. The largest remainder method satisfies not only lower quota but also
upper quota: a party i with ni out of n votes must not receive more than ⌈k · ni/n⌉
seats. However, the largest remainder method fails an important axiom called population
monotonicity, which states that an increase in support must not harm a party. For further
details, we refer the interested reader to the aforementioned books on apportionment
methods [19, 175].
We are now ready to formulate the main results of Brill et al. [50]:
Theorem 4 ([50]). PAV, sequential PAV, seq-Phragme´n, and lexmin-Phragme´n extend
the D’Hondt method of apportionment. Phragme´n’s variance-minimizing rule19 extends
the Sainte-Lague¨ method of apportionment. If n is divisible by k, then Monroe’s rule
extends the largest remainders method.
The three methods of apportionment that are mentioned in Theorem 4 are all well-
known, commonly used, and considered very proportional; they differ only in the way how
the fractional seats are rounded. Thus, the corresponding ABC rules listed in Theorem 4
behave all well on party-list profiles; these rules can be considered good contenders for
being proportional. In addition, we show in the appendix that also Greedy Monroe
extends the largest remainder method when n is divisible by k (Proposition A.5), but
both Monroe’s rule and Greedy Monroe do not if n is not divisible by k (Proposition A.6).
19This rule is similar to lexmin-Phragme´n but minimizes the variance of loads instead of the maximum
load, see [49, 112] for a precise definition.
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Lackner and Skowron [126], then extended the results of Brill et al. [50], providing
strong arguments in favor of PAV:
Theorem 5 ([126]). PAV is the unique extension of the D’Hondt method of apportionment
that satisfies neutrality, anonymity, consistency, and continuity.
5.2 Cohesive Groups
In party-list profiles (Definition 10), voters can be arranged in groups with identical pref-
erences. Then, proportionality requires that a large-enough group of voters with identical
preferences deserves a certain number of representatives in the elected committee (pro-
portional to the size of the group). This approach can be generalized to groups with
non-identical but similar preferences. In this section, we discuss axioms that relax the
requirements for groups of voters to be eligible for representatives. These axioms are
based on the concept of ℓ-cohesiveness:
Definition 11. A group V ⊆ N is ℓ-cohesive if: (i) |V | ≥ ℓ · n
k
, and (ii)
∣∣⋂
i∈V A(i)
∣∣ ≥ ℓ.
An ℓ-cohesive group consists of a ℓ/k-th fraction of voters, thus, intuitively, such a
group should be able to control at least ℓ/k · k = ℓ committee seats. Further, an ℓ-
cohesive group agrees on ℓ candidates, so one can ensure each member of the group gets
ℓ representatives by selecting only ℓ candidates. It is, hence, tempting to require that for
each ℓ-cohesive group V , each voter from V should be given at least ℓ representatives in
the elected committee. Unfortunately, this would be too strong—there exists no rule that
would satisfy this property.
Example 19. Consider a profile A with four candidates (a, b, c, d) and 12 voters, with
the following approval sets:
A(1) : {a, d} A(4) : {a, b} A(7) : {b, c} A(10) : {c, d}
A(2) : {a} A(5) : {b} A(8) : {c} A(11) : {d}
A(3) : {a} A(6) : {b} A(9) : {c} A(12) : {d}
Let k = 3. The group {1, 2, 3, 4} is 1-cohesive, as it has a commonly approved candidate
(a) and is of size 12
3
= 4. If we want to give each voter in this group a representative,
candidate a has to be in the winning committee (voters 2 and 3 only approve a). Now
observe that also the groups {4, 5, 6, 7}, {7, 8, 9, 10}, and {10, 11, 12, 1} are also 1-cohesive.
Thus, also candidates b, c, and d have to be in any winning committee. This is impossible
as we are interested in committees of size 3. We see that it is impossible to satisfy every
voter in 1-cohesive groups. ⊣
This formulation can be weakened a bit without losing much of its intuitive appeal.
The two weaker concepts that we start our discussion with are extended justified represen-
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tation (EJR) [14] and Proportionality Degree [15, 182, 189, 194].20 The former concept is
formulated as an axiom, the latter as a proportionality guarantee specified by a function.
Definition 12 (Extended justified representation, EJR). An ABC rule R satisfies ex-
tended justified representation (EJR) if for each election instance E = (A, k), each win-
ning committee W ∈ R(E), and each ℓ-cohesive group of voters V there exists a voter
v ∈ V with at least ℓ representatives in W , i.e., |A(i) ∩W | ≥ ℓ.
Example 20. Let us revisit Example 19. The committee {a, b, c} satisfies the condition
of EJR: every 1-cohesive group contains at least one voter with one representative in
{a, b, c}. For example, for the 1-cohesive group {10, 11, 12, 1}, the voters 10 and 1 have a
representative in the committee. Note that in this example actually all size-3 committees
satisfy the EJR condition; also there are no ℓ-cohesive groups for ℓ ≥ 2. ⊣
Definition 13 (Proportionality Degree). Fix a function f : N → R. An ABC rule R
has a proportionality degree of f if for each election instance E = (A, k), each winning
committee W ∈ R(E), and each ℓ-cohesive group of voters V , the average number of
representatives that voters from V get in W is at least f(ℓ), i.e.,
1
|V |
·
∑
i∈V
|A(i) ∩W | ≥ f(ℓ).
At first, it might appear that even for large cohesive groups, EJR gives a guarantee
only to a single voter within this group. However, the EJR property applies to any group
of agents: Let V be an ℓ-cohesive group. If we remove the voter with ℓ representatives
(which, by EJR, is guaranteed to exist), the resulting group will be at least (ℓ−1)-cohesive.
Consequently, in such a group there must exist a voter with at least ℓ−1 representatives,
etc. As a consequence of this argument, EJR implies a proportionality degree of at least
fR(ℓ) = ℓ−12 [182].
Example 19 also shows that there exists no rule with a proportionality degree of f(ℓ) =
ℓ:
Example 21. Consider again the profile of Example 19. Assume, there exists a rule R
with a proportionality degree of fR(ℓ) = ℓ and let k = 3. The group {1, 2, 3, 4} is 1-
cohesive, so in order to ensure that these voters get on average one representative, can-
didate a must be selected. By applying the same reasoning to {4, 5, 6, 7} we infer that b
must be selected. Analogously, we conclude that c and d must be selected. However, there
are only three seats in the committee, a contradiction. ⊣
Aziz et al. [15] generalize the above example and proved that there exists no rule with
a proportionality degree of f(ℓ) = ℓ− 1 + ǫ for ǫ > 0. PAV matches this bound, and thus
has an optimal proportionality degree.
20Proportionality degree was initially referred to as average satisfaction of ℓ-cohesive groups [15, 182].
Skowron et al. [194] called an almost equivalent property κ-group representation.
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Theorem 6 ([14, 15]). PAV has a proportionality degree of ℓ− 1. It also satisfies EJR.
In contrast, the two sequential variants of PAV do not satisfy EJR: both seq-PAV
and rev-seq-PAV fail even the much weaker justified representation axiom mentioned
below [8, 14]. However, the proportionality guarantees of Theorem 6 also hold for a
local-search variant of PAV [15], which—in contrast to PAV itself—runs in polynomial
time. Thus, EJR and a proportionality degree of ℓ− 1 are achievable in polynomial time.
Aziz et al. [15] also construct a second polynomial-time computable (but rather involved)
rule that satisfies EJR. More recently, Peters and Skowron [164] proved that Rule X
satisfies EJR, which is also computable in polynomial time. Among the rules introduced
in Section 3, PAV and Rule X are the only ones that satisfy EJR. An overview of the
proportionality degree of rules can be found in Table 2.
Let us consider two other, strictly weaker properties than EJR, which have been
considered in the literature.
Definition 14 (Proportional justified representation, PJR [182]). An ABC rule R sat-
isfies proportional justified representation (PJR) if for each election E = (A, k), each
winning committee W ∈ R(E), and each ℓ-cohesive group of voters V it holds that⋃
i∈V |A(i) ∩W | ≥ ℓ.
Definition 15 (Justified representation, JR [14]). An ABC rule R satisfies justified
representation (JR) if for each election E = (A, k), each W ∈ R(E), and each 1-cohesive
group of voters V there exists a voter v ∈ V who is represented by at least one member
of W .
PJR and JR are much weaker properties than EJR; in particular EJR implies PJR,
which in turn implies JR. Example 22, below, illustrates that the stronger of the two
axioms, PJR, can be satisfied even by rules that could be considered very bad from the
perspective of proportionality degree (and, thus, also from the perspective of approximat-
ing EJR). On the other hand, there exist rules with good proportionality degree that do
not satisfy even JR—this happens, e.g., when a rule does not provide sufficient guaran-
tees for 1-cohesive groups (although it might satisfy EJR for ℓ ≥ 2). Generally, justified
representation should not be viewed as a proportionality axiom but rather a property
capturing the idea of diversity, which we will discuss in Section 5.5. In contrast, PJR can
be viewed as a moderate proportionality requirement, significantly weaker than EJR but
stronger than, e.g., lower quota on party-list profile. We refer to Table 2 for an overview
which rules satisfy JR and PJR.
Example 22. Fix k and consider the following instance:
ck+1
ck+2
· · ·
c2k
c1
V1
c2
V2
c3
V3
· · ·
· · ·
ck
Vk
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There are 2k candidates. The voters can be divided into k equal-size groups so that the vot-
ers from the i-th group, in the diagram denoted as Vi, approve ci and {ck+1, . . . , c2k}. Com-
mittee {c1, . . . , ck} (marked blue) satisfies PJR, but clearly, {ck+1, . . . , c2k} (marked green)
is a much better choice from the perspective of proportionality degree. Also, {ck+1, . . . , c2k}
satisfies the EJR condition while {c1, . . . , ck} does not. This example shows that PJR im-
plies no better proportionality degree than f(ℓ) = 1. ⊣
Given that there are rather few rules satisfying EJR, Bredereck et al. [46] performed
computer simulations for several distributions of voters’ preferences and checked how hard
it is on average to find a committee that satisfies the condition imposed by EJR. They
concluded that ℓ-cohesive groups for ℓ ≥ 2 are quite rare, and that a random committee
among those that satisfy the much weaker condition of JR is quite likely to satisfy the
one of EJR as well. Their second conclusion was that JR, PJR, and EJR, while highly
desired, do not guarantee on their own a sensible selection of committees, and one needs
to put forward additional criteria. Otherwise, there are often many committees satisfying
these conditions, and these committees may vary significantly.
To sum up, when considering proportionality axioms based on cohesive groups, PAV
stands out as the most proportional rule. Rule X comes at a close second (its propor-
tionality degree is lower) but is computable in polynomial time. If we desire a committee
monotone rule, then seq-Phragme´n is the best known choice: it has a proportionality
degree of fPhrag(ℓ) =
ℓ−1
2
[189], i.e., the proportionality degree that is implied by EJR,
and satisfies PJR [49].
5.3 Laminar Proportionality and Priceability
The properties that we discussed in Section 5.2 (extended justified representation and
the proportionality degree) and the axiomatic characterization given in Theorem 5 all
indicate that PAV provides particularly strong proportionality guarantees. Specifically,
one could interpret these results as suggesting that PAV is a better rule—in terms of
proportionality—than Phragme´n’s sequential rule and Rule X. However, drawing such a
conclusion based on the so-far presented results would be too early—in this section we
explain that proportionality can be understood in at least two different ways and that
the axioms we discussed so far capture and formalize only one specific form of propor-
tionality. We explain that Phragme´n’s sequential rule and Rule X provide very strong
proportionality guarantees, but with respect to an interpretation of proportionality that is
not captured by the properties based on cohesive groups, and which is—to some extent—
incomparable with the type of proportionality guaranteed by PAV.
Let us start by illustrating the difference in how PAV and Phragme´n’s sequential rule
(and Rule X) operate through the following example.
Example 23 ([164]). There are 15 candidates and 6 voters—the voters’ approval sets are
depicted in the diagram below. The committee shaded in blue in the left-hand side picture
is the one that is selected by the Phragme´n’s sequential rule and by Rule X. The committee
shaded in the right-hand side picture is chosen by PAV.
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c1
c2
c3
c4 c5 c6
c7
c8
c9
c10
c11
c12
c13
c14
c15
1 2 3 4 5 6
(a) Phragme´n’s sequential rule and Rule X
c1
c2
c3
c4 c5 c6
c7
c8
c9
c10
c11
c12
c13
c14
c15
1 2 3 4 5 6
(b) PAV
The approval sets of voters 1, 2, and 3 are disjoint from those of voters 4, 5, and 6.
It seems intuitive that the first three voters, who together form half of the society, should
be able to decide about half of the elected candidates. Phragme´n’s sequential rule and
Rule X select committees, where the first three voters approve in total half members,
thus the behavior of these rules is consistent with the aforementioned understanding of
proportionality. PAV follows a different principle: In the committee depicted in (a), each
of the first three voters approves 4 candidates; each of the remaining three voters approves
only 2 committee members. PAV notices that this is the case, and tries to reduce the
societal inequality of voters’ satisfaction by removing one representative of voter 1 and
adding one to 4; similarly, PAV considers that it is more fair to remove the representatives
of 2 and 3, and add the candidates liked by 5 and 6. On the one hand, PAV prefers to pick
a committee that minimizes the societal inequality in the voters’ satisfactions (measured
as the number of approved committee members). On the other hand, it punishes voters
1, 2, and 3 for being agreeable and “easy to satisfy” with fewer committee members—PAV
allows them to decide only about one quarter of the committee. ⊣
Example 23 illustrates that PAV and Phragme´n’s sequential rule (and Rule X) follow
two different types of proportionality. PAV implements a welfarist type of proportion-
ality which is primarily concerned with the welfare (satisfaction) of the voters. This
type of proportionality is captured, e.g., by the properties discussed in Section 5.2. PAV
also satisfies the Pigou–Dalton principle of transfers, which says that given an election
(A, k) and two committees, W and W ′, which in total get the same numbers of approvals
(scAV(A,W ) = scAV(A,W
′)), the one which minimizes the societal inequality should be
preferred. Phragme´n’s sequential rule and Rule X, on the other hand, implement propor-
tionality with respect to power, which—informally speaking—says that a group consisting
of an α fraction of voters should be given a voting power that enables to decide about an
α fraction of the committee. In other words, the type of proportionality of Phragme´n-like
rules is not mainly concerned with the welfare of groups but also with the justification of
welfare, i.e., voting power.
Peters and Skowron [164] discuss two properties—laminar proportionality and
priceability—which aim at formally capturing the high-level idea of proportionality with
respect to power. The first of the two properties—laminar proportionality—is very sim-
ilar in spirit to proportionality on party-list profiles. The corresponding axiom identifies
a class of well-structured election instances—called laminar elections—and specifies how
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a laminar proportional rule should behave on these profiles. Laminar profiles are more
general than party-list profiles and are defined by a recursive structure, similar to the
election from Example 23.
The second property, which we will discuss in more detail, is priceability. Intuitively,
we say that a committee W is priceable if we can endow each voter a fixed budget and
if for each voter there exists a payment function such that: (1) each voter pays only for
the elected candidates she approves of, (2) each candidate gets a total payment of 1, and
(3) there is no group of voters who approve a non-elected candidate, and who in total
have more than one unit of unspent budget.
Definition 16 (Priceability). Given an election instance (A, k), a committee W is price-
able if there exists a voter’s budget p ∈ R+ and pi : C → [0, 1] for each voter i ∈ N such
that:
(1)
∑
c∈C pi(c) ≤ p for each i ∈ N ,
(2) pi(c) = 0 for each i ∈ N and c /∈ A(i),
(3)
∑
i∈N pi(c) = 1 for each c ∈ W ,
(4)
∑
i∈N pi(c) = 0 for each c /∈ W , and
(5)
∑
i∈N(c)
(
p−
∑
c′∈W pi(c
′)
)
≤ 1 for each c /∈ W .
An ABC rule is priceable if it returns only priceable committees.
Example 24. Consider the election instance from Example 23. The committees re-
turned by Phragme´n’s sequential rule and by Rule X are priceable. For example, con-
sider W1 = {c1, . . . , c6, c7, c8, c10, c11, c13, c14} (the committee shaded blue in the left figure
in Example 23). This committee is priceable as witnessed by the following price sys-
tem: the voters’ budget is p = 2, and the payment functions are as follows (we only
specify the non-zero payments): p1(ci) = p2(ci) = p3(ci) = 1/3 for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and
p1(c4) = p2(c5) = p3(c6) = p4(c7) = p4(c8) = p5(c10) = p5(c11) = p6(c13) = p6(c14) = 1.
Each voters fully spends their budget of 2.
On the other hand, the committee W2 = {c1, c2, c3, c7, . . . , c15} returned by PAV (the
one shaded blue in the right figure in Example 23) is not priceable. Indeed, if the voters’
budget p were ≤ 2, then the voters 4, 5, 6 could not afford to pay for 9 candidates c7, . . . , c15.
If p > 2, then some of the voters 1, 2, 3, say voter 1, would have a remaining budget of
more than 1. Hence, this voter would have more budget than needed to buy a candidate
outside of W2 (e.g., c4), which contradicts condition (5) in Definition 16. ⊣
Peters and Skowron [164] generalized Example 24 and showed that no welfarist rule
(see Definition 1) is priceable, hence that indeed priceability is inherently not a welfarist
concept. The same is true for laminar proportionality.
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Theorem 7 ([164]). Phragme´n’s sequential rule and Rule X are laminar proportional and
priceable. No welfarist rule is laminar proportional nor priceable. No rule satisfying the
Pigou–Dalton principle of transfers is laminar proportional nor priceable.
While priceability is not a welfarist concept, it implies proportional justified repre-
sentation. Further, all priceable rules must be equivalent to the D’Hondt method of
apportionment on party-list profiles (cf. Theorem 4).
We mention one more property—perfect representation [182]—which is loosely re-
lated to priceability. It also requires an explanation how voters can distribute their sup-
port/power in a way that justifies electing a committee; however, the axiom applies only
in very specific situations.
Definition 17 (Perfect representation [182]). We say that a committeeW satisfies perfect
representation if the set of voters can be divided into k equal-sized disjoint groups N =
N1 ∪ . . . ∪ Nk (|Ni| = n/k for each i ∈ k) and if we can assign a distinct candidate from
W to each of these groups in a way that for each i ∈ k the voters from Ni all approve
their assigned candidate. An ABC rule R satisfies perfect representation if R returns only
committees satisfying perfect representation whenever such committees exist.
Perfect representation is incompatible with EJR [182] and with weak (and strong)
Pareto efficiency (Proposition A.8), and it is not implied by (nor implies) priceability.
Among the rules considered in this paper, only Monroe [182] and lexmin-Phragme´n [49]
satisfies perfect representation, as does the variance-based rule by Phragme´n mentioned
in Theorem 4 [49].
To sum up, if we are mainly interested in the welfarist interpretation of proportionality,
as captured by axioms that specify how cohesive groups of voters should be treated,
then PAV is the best among the considered rules. Yet, sequential PAV, seq-Phragme´n,
and Rule X perform also reasonably well with respect to these criteria, and they are
computable in polynomial time. Sequential PAV, however, can be considered slightly
worse than these other rules, since it does not satisfy JR, and so it might discriminate
small cohesive groups of voters. If we are interested in proportionality with respect to
power, then Rule X and Phragme´n’s sequential rule are the two superior rules. It is not
entirely clear which one of the two rules is better. On the one hand, Rule X satisfies
the appealing axiom of EJR; on the other hand, Phragme´n’s sequential rule is committee
monotone (see Section 4.3). In Table 2, we highlighted the three rules that—with the
current state of knowledge—we consider the best ABC rules in terms of proportionality;
we use two colors to distinguish the two types of proportionality.
5.4 The Core
An important concept of group fairness that has been extensively studied in the context
of ABC rules is the core. This notion is adopted from cooperative game theory.21
21The definition used in the literature on multiwinner voting is based on the definition of the core for
games with non-transferable payoffs [158].
42
Definition 18 (Core [14]). Given an instance (A, k) we say that a committee W is in the
core if for each V ⊆ N and each T ⊆ C with
|T |
k
≤
|V |
n
(1)
there exists a voter i ∈ V such that |A(i)∩T | ≤ |A(i)∩W |. We say that an ABC rule R
satisfies the core property if for each instance (A, k) each winning committee W ∈ R(A, k)
is in the core.
Informally speaking, the core property requires that a group V constituting an α
fraction of voters should be able to control an α fraction of the committee. If such a
group can propose a set T of ⌊αk⌋ candidates such that each voter in V is more satisfied
with the proposed set T than with the winning committee W , then the group V would
have an incentive to deviate, hence would witness that committee W is not stable (and, in
some sense, also not fair). If a winning committee is in the core, then no such a deviation
is possible.
The core property implies extended justified representation (Definition 12): Assume
an ABC rule R satisfies the core property and consider an instance (A, k), a winning
committee W , and an ℓ-cohesive group of voters V . Let T be the set of ℓ candidates that
are approved by all the voters in V (such candidates exist because V is ℓ-cohesive). Since
W is in the core, there must exists a voter i ∈ V such that |A(i) ∩W | ≥ |A(i) ∩ T | = ℓ,
hence the condition of EJR must be satisfied. While the notion of core strictly generalizes
EJR and thus implies strong satisfaction guarantees for cohesive groups, it can be also
viewed as a concept formalizing the idea of proportionality with respect to power (cf.
Section 5.3).
It is an important open question whether there exists an ABC rule that satisfies the
core property, or—equivalently—whether the core is always non-empty. For the time
being only partial answers to this intriguing question are known:
1. None of the rules mentioned in Section 3 satisfies the property. Since a rule sat-
isfying the core must satisfy EJR, only PAV and Rule X come into consideration.
However, counterexamples for both are known [14, 164]. For PAV, the instance from
Example 23 shows a violation of the core.
2. No welfarist rule (Definition 1) can satisfy the core property [164].
3. If one restricts the attention to a special subclass of approval profiles, so-called
approval-based party-list profiles [51], the situation changes. Approval-based party-
list profiles are approval profiles where each candidate appears with at least k copies,
i.e., for every candidate c it holds that |{c′ ∈ C : N(c) = N(c′)}| ≥ k. Brill et al. [51]
proved that PAV satisfies the core property on approval-based party-list profiles; as
mentioned before, PAV does not satisfy the core property in the general case.
As it remains unclear whether an ABC rule satisfying the core property is an achievable
goal, several works in the most recent literature analyzed relaxed notions of the core. We
review these notions in the subsequent sections.
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5.4.1 Relaxation by Randomization
The first type of relaxation that we consider is a probabilistic variant of the notion, i.e.,
the question becomes: “can core-like properties be guaranteed in expectation (ex-ante)?”.
Cheng et al. [63] proved that there always exists a lottery over committees that satisfies
the core property in expectation. Let EX∼∆(X) denote the expected value of a random
variable X distributed according to a lottery (probability distribution) ∆.
Theorem 8 ([63]). For each election instance (A, k) there exists a lottery over commit-
tees ∆ such that for each group of voters V ⊆ N and each T ⊆ C it holds that
|T |
k
>
EW∼∆ (N(T,W ))
n
, (2)
where N(T,W ) is the set of voters who prefer T over W :
N(T,W ) = {i ∈ N : |A(i) ∩ T | > |A(i) ∩W |} .
Note that Equation (2) is indeed a negated, probabilistic version of Equation (1),
showing that in expectation there are too few voters to propose a different committee.
While it is not known whether such a lottery ∆ can be found in a polynomial time,
Cheng et al. [63] prove that if we restrict our attention only to sets T of size bounded by
a constant, then for each ǫ > 0 there is a polynomial-time algorithm that computes ∆
such that (1 + ǫ) · |T |
k
> EW∼∆(N(T,W ))
n
.
5.4.2 Relaxation by Deterministic Approximation
Another approach is to ask whether the core property can be well approximated. A few
notions of approximation have been proposed; Definition 19 below unifies the definitions
considered in the literature.
Definition 19. We say that an ABC rule R provides a γ-multiplicative-η-additive-
satisfaction β-group-size approximation to the core if for each instance (A, k), each win-
ning committee W ∈ R(A, k), each subset of voters V ⊆ N , and each subset of candidates
T ⊆ C with
β ·
|T |
k
≤
|V |
n
there exists a voter i ∈ V such that |A(i) ∩ T | ≤ γ · |A(i) ∩W |+ η.
There are two components in Definition 19: The satisfaction-approximation compo-
nent says that a voter i ∈ V has an incentive to deviate towards T only if her gain in
satisfaction is sufficiently large, that is, if i’s satisfaction in T is greater at least by a
multiplicative factor of γ and an additive factor of η than her satisfaction in W . The
group-size-approximation component prohibits deviations towards sets T which are (by
a multiplicative factor of β) smaller than k · |V |
n
, as imposed by the core. If γ = 1, then
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we omit the term “γ-multiplicative” from the name of the property. Similarly, if η = 0
we omit the term “η-additive”, and if β = 1, then we omit the term “β-group-size”. The
satisfaction-approximation and the group-size approximation are incomparable.
When considering the problem of approximating the core, we can distinguish two
classes of algorithms that have been considered in the literature. The first class con-
tains dedicated algorithms, which are mostly based on dependent rounding of fractional
committees. The second class consists of well-known rules, such as PAV or Rule X.
Jiang et al. [113] present an algorithm that provides 32-group-size approximation to the
core. Their approach is based on dependent rounding of lotteries that are in expectation
in the core (the existence of such lotteries is guaranteed by Theorem 8). Notably, the
approach of Jiang et al. [113] extends much beyond the approval-based preferences.
Fain et al. [90] present a family of algorithms based on dependent rounding of fractional
committees (returned by a linear program that closely resembles the formulation of PAV as
an integer linear program). For each λ ∈ (1, 2] they provide an algorithm that guarantees
a λ-multiplicative-η-additive-satisfaction 1
2−λ -group-size approximation to the core, where
η = O
(
1
λ4
log( k
λ
)
)
. Their algorithm naturally extends to a more general model related to
participatory budgeting.
For commonly known rules the following results are known: Cheng et al. [63] prove that
PAV does not guarantee β-group-size approximation to the core even for β = Θ(
√
(k)).
On the other hand, Peters and Skowron [164] prove that PAV gives 2-multiplicative-
satisfaction approximation to the core. Further, for each ǫ > 0 no rule that satisfies the
Pigou–Dalton principle can provide a (2− ǫ)-multiplicative-satisfaction approximation to
the core. Thus, PAV can be viewed as giving the strongest multiplicative-satisfaction
approximation to the core subject to satisfying the Pigou–Dalton principle of transfers.
Finally, they show that Rule X provides O(log(k))-multiplicative-1-additive-satisfaction
approximation to the core.
5.4.3 Relaxation by Constraining the Space of Deviations
Yet another approach to relaxing the core property is to prohibit only certain types of
deviations. As we have already explained at the beginning of this section, EJR can
be viewed as a restricted variant of the core property: It prohibits the deviations of
groups of voters towards outcomes T on which the deviating voters unanimously agree.
Intuitively, if a group V agrees on all candidates from T , then it is easier for such a group
to synchronize and to deviate, thus EJR can be viewed as the minimal restricted variant
of the core. Motivated by the same arguments Peters and Skowron [164] considered other
restricted variants of the core property.
A committee property is a set of triples (A, k,W ), where (A, k) is an election instance
and W is a size-k committee. We write A|V for profile A restricted to voters in V ⊆ N .
Definition 20 ([164]). Let P be a committee property. Given an instance (A, k) we say
that a pair (V, T ), with V ⊆ N, T ⊆ C, is an allowed deviation from a committee W if
(1) |T |
k
≤ |V |
n
, (2) |A(i) ∩ T | > |A(i) ∩W | for each i ∈ V , and (3) T has property P, i.e.,
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(A|V , |T |, T ) ∈ P. An ABC rule R satisfies the core subject to P if for each instance
(A, k) and each winning committee W ∈ R(A, k) there exists no allowed deviation.
For example, let Pcoh be a committee property such that (A, k,W ) ∈ Pcoh if and only if
A(i) =W for all voters i in the domain of A; we call Pcoh cohesiveness (cf. Definition 11).
Then, EJR can be equivalently defined as the core subject to cohesiveness.
Rule X satisfies core subject to priceability with equal payments, which is a stronger
variant of the priceability (Definition 16), yet weaker than cohesiveness [164]. It is an
open question whether the core subject to weaker (yet still natural) types of constraints
is always non-empty.
5.5 Degressive and Regressive Proportionality
The notions of proportionality that we discussed in Sections 5.1 to 5.4 aimed at capturing
the following intuitive idea: An α fraction of voters should be able to decide about an
α fraction of the committee—in this approach the relation between the size of the group
and its eligibility is linear. In this section we discuss two alternative concepts: degressive
and regressive proportionality. These two concepts should be viewed more as high-level
ideas than formal properties. We first explain them intuitively, providing an illustrative
example, and next we will discuss a few formal approaches to reasoning about degressive
and regressive proportionality.
According to degressive proportionality smaller groups of voters should be favored,
i.e., be eligible to more representatives in the elected committee than in the case of
linear proportionality.22 An extreme form of degressive proportionality is diversity [93]—
there, if possible, each voter should be represented by at least one candidate in the
elected committee. At the other end is the idea of regressive proportionality, where
the emphasis is put on well-representing large groups. An extreme form of regressive
proportionality is individual excellence [93], where it is assumed that only the candidates
with the highest total support from the voters should be elected. In fact, these two
notions—the diversity and the individual excellence—are extreme to the extent that they
can no longer be considered notions of proportionality. Example 25, below, illustrates
the ideas of degressive and regressive proportionality, and the two extreme variants of
them—diversity and individual excellence.
Example 25. Consider the approval-based preference profile from Example 17:
60 voters : {a1, . . . , a10} 20 voters : {b1, . . . , b6} 10 voters : {c1, c2}
8 voters : {d1, . . . , a4} 2 voters : {e1, e2, e3}.
22Degressive proportional apportionments are often used for distributing parliamentary seats among
geographical regions, e.g., in the division of the European Parliament seats among EU countries (see [178]
for the discussion on arguments and negotiations that resulted in the degressive apportionment rule used
for assembling the European Parliament).
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# votes 60 20 10 8 2
linear proportionality (Sainte-Lague¨) 6 2 1 1 0
linear proportionality (D’Hondt) 7 2 1 0 0
degressive proportionality (example 1) 4 3 2 1 0
degressive proportionality (example 2) 3 3 3 1 0
diversity (example 1) 4 3 1 1 1
diversity (example 2) 2 2 2 2 2
regressive proportionality (example) 8 2 0 0 0
individual excellence 10 0 0 0 0
Table 3: Flavors of (dis)proportionality
A linearly-proportional committee W1 could consist of six candidates from A, two candi-
dates from B, one candidate from C, and one candidate from D (this is the committee
selected by the Sainte-Lague¨ apportionment method). Another linearly-proportional com-
mittee could consist of seven candidates candidates from A but none from D (this is the
committee selected by the D’Hondt apportionment method).
In contrast, a degressive-proportional committee W2 could, for example, consist of four
candidates from A, three candidates from B, two candidates from C, and one candidate
from D. Another example of a degressive-proportional committee would be W3 with three
candidates from each of the sets A, B, and C, and one from D. Committees W2 and
W3, however, are not diverse, since two voters who support E = {e1, e2, e3} are not
represented at all. A diverse committee could consist of, e.g., four candidates from A,
three candidates from B, one candidates from C, one candidate from D, and one candidate
from E. A regressive-proportional committee would include more candidates from the set
A = {a1, . . . , a10} at the cost of groups supported by less voters. For example, a committee
that consists of eight candidates from A and two candidates from B would be regressive-
proportional. Table 3 shows the example relations between a size of a group and its number
of representatives for different forms of proportionality: ⊣
The arguments in favor of degressive proportionality usually come from the analysis of
probabilistic models describing how the decisions made by the elected committee map to
the satisfaction of individual voters participating in the process of electing the committee
(for party-list preferences an excellent exposition is given by Koriyama et al. [122]; see
also [133, 145]). An interesting concrete example of degressive proportionality is square-
root proportionality devised by Penrose [159] (see also [195]), where the idea is that
the groups of voters should be represented proportionally to the square-roots of their
sizes.23 Further, degressive proportionally in general, and diversity in particular, are
23This method has been proposed for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly [52] and for allocating
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particularly appealing ideas in the context of deliberative democracy—there, the goal
is to select a committee that should discuss and deliberate on various issues rather than
make majoritarian decisions. It is argued that for deliberative democracy it is particularly
important to represent as many various opinions in the committees as possible [61, 152],
which can be achieved by maximizing the number of voters who are represented in the
elected committee.
On the other hand, the idea of regressive proportionality is particularly appealing
when the goal is to select a committee of candidates based on their individual merits, for
example when the goal of an election is to select finalists in a contest or to choose a set
of grants that should be funded (then, the voters act as judges/experts).
In the remaining part of this section we discuss two approaches to formalizing the ideas
of degressive and regressive proportionality: axiomatic approaches and a quantitative
approach.
5.5.1 Axiomatic Approaches to Diversity and Individual Excellence
The axiomatic approach generally applies only to the extreme forms of the degressive
and regressive proportionality, i.e., to diversity and individual excellence, respectively.
This approach is similar to the one we discussed in Section 5.1: by formalizing the con-
cepts of diversity and individual excellence on party-list profiles (Definition 10), we obtain
axiomatic characterizations for the more general domain of ABC rules.
Intuitively, disjoint diversity requires that in party-list profiles as many voters as pos-
sible have at least one representative in the elected committee. Disjoint equality says that
each approval carries the same strength, and so all candidates that are approved once
have the same right for being elected.
Definition 21 (Disjoint diversity). An ABC rule R satisfies disjoint diversity if for each
party-list instance (A, k) with voter sets (N1, . . . , Np) and |N1| ≥ |N2| ≥ . . . ≥ |Np|, there
exists a winning committee W ∈ R(A, k) that contains one candidate for each of the k
largest parties, i.e., for each r ≤ min(p, k) and each i ∈ Nr we have that A(i) ∩W 6= ∅.
Definition 22 (Disjoint equality). An ABC rule R satisfies disjoint equality if for each
election instance (A, k) where each candidate is approved at most once and the number
of approved candidates is at least k (i.e., |
⋃
i∈N A(i)| ≥ k), a committee W is winning if
and only if it contains only approved candidates, W ⊆
⋃
i∈N A(i).
The following theorems show that, similarly as in case of linear proportionality, the
concepts of disjoint diversity and disjoint equality uniquely extend to the full domain of
approval-based preferences if one assumes the natural axioms of symmetry and consistency
(and a few more technical axioms).
voting weights in the Council of the European Union [27].
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Figure 7: A diagram illustrating the relation between defining w-functions of Thiele meth-
ods and the type of proportionality these Thiele rules implement.
Theorem 9 ([126]). The Approval Chamberlin–Courant rule is the only non-trivial ABC
rule that satisfies symmetry, consistency, weak efficiency, continuity, and disjoint diver-
sity. Multi-Winner Approval Voting is the only ABC ranking rule that satisfies symmetry,
consistency, weak efficiency, continuity, and disjoint equality.
Lackner and Skowron [126] provided a similar analysis for intermediate notions of
degressive and regressive proportionality. They conclude that w-Thiele methods based
on w-scoring functions that have a larger slope than the w-function of PAV, wPAV(x) =∑x
i=1
1/i, are more oriented towards regressive proportionality, whereas w-functions that
have a smaller slope, are closer in spirit to the idea of degressive proportionality. This
relation is symbolically visualized in Figure 7.
Finally, Subiza and Peris [199] propose an axiom called α-unanimity (parameterized
with α ∈ [0, 1]), which can be seen as a strong diversity axiom. The authors propose
a voting rule (Lexiunanimous Approval Voting) that satisfies this axiom; this rule is a
refined version of CC. Thiele methods (including CC itself) do not satisfy this axiom for
arbitrary α.
5.5.2 Quantifying Degressive and Regressive Proportionality
The second approach to formally reason about degressive and regressive proportionality is
quantitative in nature. Lackner and Skowron [128] define two measures—the utilitarian
guarantee and the representation guarantee—that can be used to quantify how well a
given rule performs in terms of individual excellence and diversity.
Recall that scAV(A,W ) denotes the total number of approvals a given committee
receives in profile A; scCC(A,W ) denotes the number of voters who approve at least one
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member of W .
Definition 23 (Utilitarian and Representation Guarantee [128]). The utilitarian guar-
antee of an ABC rule R is a function κAV : N → [0, 1] that takes as input an integer k,
representing the committee size, and is defined as:
κAV(k) = inf
A∈A(C)
minW∈R(A,k)(scAV(A,W ))
maxW : |W |=k(scAV(A,W ))
.
The representation guarantee of an ABC rule R is a function κCC : N → [0, 1] defined as:
κCC(k) = inf
A∈A(C)
minW∈R(A,k)(scCC(A,W ))
maxW : |W |=k(scCC(A,W ))
.
Note that the utilitarian and the representation guarantee of an ABC rule R mea-
sure how well rule R approximates Multi-Winner Approval Voting and the Approval
Chamberlin–Courant rule, respectively. These two rules embody the principles of diver-
sity and individual excellence (cf. Theorem 9).
Lackner and Skowron [128] show that the utilitarian guarantee of PAV, sequential
PAV, and seq-Phragme´n is Θ(1/
√
k); their representation guarantee 1/2 + Θ(1/k). CC and
seq-CC achieve a better representation guarantee (of 1 and 1− 1/e, respectively), but their
utilitarian guarantee is only Θ(1/k). In that sense, these three proportional rules (PAV,
sequential PAV, and seq-Phragme´n) can be viewed as a desirable compromise between
the two guarantees. On the other, the authors also show that proportional rules are
never an optimal compromise. Finally, p-geometric rules—the Thiele rules defined by
wp-geom(x) =
∑x
i=1 (
1/p)i—for different values of the parameter p span the whole spectrum
from AV to CC. By adjusting the parameter p, one can obtain any desired compromise
between the utilitarian and representation goals.
5.6 Proportionality and Strategic Voting
The ABC rules that we have considered in the context of proportionality are all prone to
manipulations (cf. Section 4.6). In this section we explain that this is not a coincidence—
achieving proportionality and strategy-proofness at the same time is inherently impossible.
This impossibility was first proved by Peters [161, 162] for resolute rules (rules that always
return a single winning committee), even for very weak formulations of the desired axioms.
(Earlier work by Aziz et al. [13] and Janson [112] already showed that certain proportional
rules—such as PAV, seq-PAV, and seq-Phragme´n—are not strategy-proof.)
Theorem 10 ([161, 162]). Suppose k ≥ 3, the number n of voters is divisible by k, and
m ≥ k + 1. Then there exists no resolute ABC rule R which satisfies the following three
axioms:
1. weak proportionality: for each party-list election (A, k) where some singleton bal-
lot {c} appears at least n/k times (|{i : A(i) = {c}}| ≥ n/k), candidate c must belong
to the winning committee: c ∈ R(A, k)
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2. weak efficiency: a candidate who is approved by no voter may not be part of the
winning committee, unless fewer than k candidates receive at least one approval.
3. inclusion-strategyproofness (as defined in Section 4.6) 24
Kluiving et al. [117] prove a similar result for irresolute rules (i.e., when rules are
allowed to output multiple tied winning committees), using cardinality-strategyproofness
and Pareto efficiency. Further, Duddy [77] proves a related impossibility result for ir-
resolute rules using slightly different axioms; this result also requires a form of Pareto
efficiency.
Lackner and Skowron [127] showed that AV is the only ABC scoring rule (Section 4.5)
that satisfies SD-strategyproofness; this result can also be seen as an impossibility result
concerning proportionality and strategyproofness within the class of ABC scoring rules.
Further, they quantified the tradeoff between strategyproofness and proportionality. For
various ABC rules they empirically measured their level of strategyproofness by assessing
the fraction of profiles, for which there exists a voter who has an incentive to misreport
her approval set. They concluded that rules which are more similar to AV (i.e., rules that
follow the principle of progressive proportionality) are less manipulable than proportional
rules. The rules that follow the principle of degressive proportionality are the most ma-
nipulable. A similar conclusion was obtained by Barrot et al. [21], but there the authors
analyzed a different class of rules—namely those based on the Hamming distance, and
spanning the spectrum from AV to Minimax Approval Voting.
5.7 Proportionality with Respect to External Attributes
In Sections 5.1 to 5.6, we have considered formal concepts that capture, in various ways,
what it means that the structure of the elected committee proportionally reflects the
(approval-based) preferences of the voters. In other words, we have considered propor-
tionality with respect to the preferences given by the voters. In this section, we briefly
consider a framework that approaches the concept of proportionality quite differently: to
analyze proportionality with respect to external attributes of the candidates.
Let us start by recalling the apportionment setting that we discussed in Section 5.1.
In the apportionment model we are given a set of candidates, each candidate belonging to
a single political party; for each political party we are given a desired fraction of seats the
party should ideally get in the elected committee (typically, this is the fraction of votes
cast on the party). The goal is to pick the committee that matches the desired fractions
as closely as possible. Thus, one can say that in the apportionment setting there is one
external attribute, which is the party affiliation, each candidate has a certain value of this
attribute, and the goal is to pick the committee where the different values of the attribute
are represented proportionally to the given desired fractions.
24This axiom can be further weakened to allow voters only to manipulate by reporting subsets of their
true approval sets.
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Now, assume that there are two attributes—each candidate has a political affiliation
and a geographic region that she represents. For each value of each attribute we are
given a desired fraction of seats that the candidates with this attribute value should get.
This setting is called bi-apportionment, and it is discussed in detail in a book chapter by
Pukelsheim [174] (several more recent articles study the bi-apportionment setting from
a computational perspective [132, 176, 186]). The model of bi-apportionment has been
further extended to an arbitrary number of attributes by Lang and Skowron [130]. There,
the authors analyzed axiomatically and algorithmically two rules that extend the D’Hondt
method and the largest remainder method to the multi-attribute apportionment.
The desired fractions in the (multi-attribute) apportionment model can be based on
the voters preferences, or they might be given exogenously (e.g., by imposing certain
quotas). In the remaining part of this section we will consider a model which takes into
account both the voters’ preferences and external constraints based on attributes of the
candidates. Instead of defining this model formally, we provide an illustrative example.
Example 26. Assume we want to select a representative committee. Such a committee
should be gender-balanced, containing 50% of male (M) and 50% of female (F) committee
members. Additionally, the committee should represent people from different educational
backgrounds: at least 25% and at most 50% of its members should have the bachelor
degree (H), between 40% and 60% should have an upper-secondary education (S), and
between 10% and 25%—a primary or lower-secondary education (P). Finally, the selected
committee should contain at least 25% young people (Y) and at least 50% senior people
(S). The pool of candidates from which we can select members of such a committee is given
in the table below. Additionally, seven voters express their preferences via the following
approval ballots.
Name Gender Education Age
c1 F H Y
c2 M S Y
c3 M S S
c4 F P S
c5 M S Y
c6 M S Y
c7 M S Y
c8 F H S
A(1) = {c1, c2, c3}
A(2) = {c3, c5}
A(3) = {c7, c8}
A(4) = {c3, c4, c5, c7}
A(5) = {c1, c8}
A(6) = {c6}
A(7) = {c1, c2, c6}
Assume we want to select k = 4 committee members. The winning committee accord-
ing to AV would be W1 = {c1, c3, c7, c8} (for simplicity, we assume the ties are broken
lexicographically c8 ≻ c7 ≻ . . . ≻ c1), and according to PAV, the winning committee would
be W2 = {c1, c3, c6, c8}. However, each of these two committees violates the attribute-level
constraints. The committee maximizing the AV-score and the PAV-score subject to these
constraints would be, respectively, W3 = {c1, c3, c4, c7} and W4 = {c3, c4, c6, c8}. ⊣
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As can be seen in this example, score-based ABC rules (in particular Thiele methods)
are suitable for this approach: the winning committee is the one with the highest score
that satisfies all external constraints. Note that this approach is not compatible with rules
that do not naturally provide a ranking of committees by scores (e.g., seq-Phragme´n or
Rule X). We will consider algorithmic aspects of this and related approaches in Section 6.2.
5.8 Open Problems
We conclude this section with a few interesting open problems:
1. Does there exist an ABC rule that satisfies EJR and committee monotonicity? Only
partial answers are known to this question. For example, it is known that such a
rule can be defined for approval-based party-list elections (see [51]; mentioned in
Section 5.4), but there is no clear generalization of this rule to the setting of ABC
rules.
2. What is the proportionality degree of rev-seq-PAV?
3. Does there exist an ABC rule that satisfies the core property? Equivalently, is the
core always non-empty? In case the core can be empty, what is a (sensible) ABC
rule that outputs a committee in the core whenever it exists?
4. Does there exist an ABC rule that satisfies priceability and Pareto efficiency?
5. We have seen in Section 5.6 that proportionality and strategyproofness is typically
incompatible. The corresponding impossibility result for arbitrary, i.e., irresolute,
ABC rules [117] relies on Pareto efficiency. Since this is a property that many
sensible ABC rules do not satisfy (see Section 4.2) it would be desirable to strengthen
this result by relaxing this condition, e.g., by replacing Pareto efficiency with weak
efficiency. Is this possible or are there ABC rules that are irresolute, strategyproof,
proportional, but not Pareto efficient?
6  Algorithms
In this section, we discuss computational problems related to ABC rules and algorithms
that solve these problems. As we have seen in Section 4.7, many ABC rules are difficult to
compute. Hence, a thorough algorithmic analysis is paramount to a practical application
of these rules.
Many algorithms that we discuss in this section are available in the Python abcvoting
library [129].
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maximize
n∑
i=1
k∑
ℓ=1
1
ℓ
· xi,ℓ (3)
subject to: xi,ℓ ∈ {0, 1} for i ∈ [n], ℓ ∈ [k] (4)
yc ∈ {0, 1} for c ∈ C (5)∑
c∈C
yc = k (6)
k∑
ℓ=1
xi,ℓ =
∑
c∈A(i)
yc for i ∈ [n] (7)
Figure 8: An ILP for computing PAV
6.1 How to Compute Winning Committees?
The arguably most central algorithmic question is: how to compute winning commit-
tees for an ABC voting rule? Clearly, the answer significantly differs from rule to rule.
Rules that can be computed in polynomial time generally do not require sophisticated
algorithms; In particular, algorithms for AV, SAV, as well as for sequential and reverse
sequential Thiele methods follow immediately from their corresponding definitions. Algo-
rithms for Phragme´n’s sequential rule and Rule X are slightly more involved but also do
not require more than a careful adaption of the corresponding mathematical definitions.
(Note that for seq-Phragme´n it is more convenient to implement its discrete formulation.)
For rules that are NP-hard to compute, we discuss four algorithmic methods in the fol-
lowing: integer linear programs, approximation algorithms, fixed-parameter algorithms,
and algorithms for structured domains.
6.1.1 Integer Linear Programs (ILPs)
The most common approach to compute NP-hard ABC rules is to employ integer linear
program (ILP) solvers, such as Gurobi or CPLEX. These are fast, general purpose solvers
used for hard optimization problems. To use such a solver, one has to encode an ABC
rule as a integer linear program, i.e., a system of linear inequalities constraining a linear
expression that is maximized or minimized. We will see examples of ILPs in the following;
all these ILPs are available in the Python abcvoting library [129].
The ILP displayed in Figure 8 shows how Thiele methods, in particular PAV, can be
expressed in such a form; this particular ILP formulation for PAV is taken from [163].
Two types of variables are used here: xi,ℓ intuitively encodes that voter i approves at
least ℓ candidates in the committee, and yc encodes that candidate c is contained in
the winning committee. Given an election instance (A, k), this ILP maximizes the PAV-
score expressed in (3). Further it ensures that exactly k candidates are selected with
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minimize D
subject to: di,c ∈ {0, 1} for i ∈ [n], c ∈ C
yc ∈ {0, 1} for c ∈ C∑
c∈C
yc = k
di,c = 1− yc for c ∈ A(i) (8)
di,c = yc for c ∈ C \ A(i) (9)∑
c∈C
di,c ≤ D (10)
Figure 9: An ILP for computing MAV
Equation (6) and that xi,ℓ indeed encodes that voter i approves at least ℓ candidates in
the committee with Equation (7). Note that it can occur xi,ℓ = 0 but xi,ℓ+1 = 1, but
this is never an optimal solution since 1
ℓ
> 1
ℓ+1
. A somewhat different ILP, for the more
general when the voters assign cardinal utilities to candidates rather than point those
candidates that they approve, can be found in [192].
As a second example of an ILP encoding, see Figure 9 for MAV. Here, yc encodes
whether candidate c is contained in the winning committee, di,c encodes whether voter i
disagrees with the decision of whether c is in the committee or not, and D is the maximum
Hamming distance between a voter and the chosen committee. Constraints (8) and (9)
fix the value of di,c, i.e.,
di,c =
{
0 if (c ∈ A(i) and yc = 1) or (c /∈ A(i) and yc = 0),
1 otherwise.
Then,
∑
c∈C di,c is the Hamming distance between the committee defined by yc and A(i).
Due to Constraint (10), these sums are ≤ D for all voters. Hence, by minimizing D, we
minimize the maximum distance.
Lastly, for Monroe’s rule, Potthoff and Brams [172] discuss ILP formulations, and for
lexmin-Phragme´n an ILP can be found in [49].
6.1.2 Approximation Algorithms
The most natural approximation algorithm for Thiele methods are their sequential vari-
ants, as described in Section 3.2. Sequential w-Thiele provides a very good approximation
of w-Thiele [143, 192]; this follows directly from a more general approximation result for
submodular set functions by Nemhauser et al. [155].
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Theorem 11 ([143, 155, 192]). Sequential w-Thiele is a factor-0.63 approximation algo-
rithm for w-Thiele. More specifically, Sequential w-Thiele achieves a w-score of at least
1− (1− 1/k)k ≥ 1− 1/e ≥ 0.63 times the optimal w-score.
One can also find approximation algorithms for the corresponding minimization prob-
lem: for w-Thiele, instead of maximizing the w-score, one can equivalently minimize the
difference to the theoretical optimum of n · (1 + 1
2
+ · · ·+ 1
k
), i.e., to minimize the w-loss
defined as
lossPAV(A,W ) = n · (1 +
1
2
+ · · ·+
1
k
)− scw(A,W ).
Byrka et al. [55] present a factor-2.35 approximation algorithm for PAV. This result re-
quires a more complex algorithm based on dependent rounding of a linear program so-
lution. It is notable that this result does not hold for weights other than the harmonic
numbers; in particular, such an approximation algorithm does not exist for CC under the
assumption that P 6= NP. While seq-PAV can be viewed as a voting rule in its own right,
this is more debatable for this rounding scheme. In particular, it cannot be expected to
satisfy nice axiomatic properties such as committee monotonicity, and thus constitutes
first and foremost an approximation of PAV.
Skowron [188] describe two alternative algorithms that for certain Thiele methods
(including PAV and CC) can provide arbitrarily good approximation guarantees and that
work in FPT time for the parameter (k, t), where t is the upper-bound on the number
of candidates each voter approves. Thus, these algorithms are practical only when the
desired size of the committee k and the approval sets of the voters are all small. On
contrary, Skowron [188] show that if each voter approves sufficiently many candidates,
then sequential w-Thiele provides an even better approximation guarantee than 0.63.
Analogous results, but with the focus on CC, have been given by Skowron and Faliszewski
[190].
For MAV, stronger approximation results hold: Byrka and Sornat [54] and Cygan et al.
[70] present polynomial-time approximation schemes (PTAS) for MAV, i.e., polynomial-
time approximation algorithms that achieves arbitrary (but fixed) precision; previous
work established first factor-3 [138] and then factor-2 [57] approximation algorithms.
6.1.3 Fixed-Parameter Algorithms
Fixed-parameter algorithms have received some attention for ABC rules. The main idea
is to identify a parameter of the problem (ideally one that is small in practice) and search
for algorithms that require only polynomial time when this parameter is constant. A
fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) algorithm for a parameter p is one with a runtime of
O(f(p) · poly(m,n)), where f is an arbitrary, typically exponential function. A very
natural parameter for multiwinner voting is k, the committee size. Alas, results for this
parameter are negative: First, Betzler et al. [29] show for Monroe and CC that it is
W[2]-hard to verify whether a committee exists with at least a certain Monroe-/CC-score
(some of these results have been strengthen by Skowron and Faliszewski [190], who show
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that the hardness holds even if the voters’ approval sets are small). Second, Misra et al.
[151] show an analogous result for MAV. Third, Aziz et al. [13] show for arbitrary Thiele
methods that testing whether a committee is winning is coW[1]-hard. These results imply
that one cannot hope for an FPT algorithm computing these ABC rules, i.e, it is unlikely
that an algorithm exists with a runtime of, e.g., O(2k · poly(m,n)).
Moreover, Betzler et al. [29] and Skowron and Faliszewski [190] provide a thorough
and detailed parameterized complexity analysis for CC and Monroe for further param-
eters (e.g., the number of unrepresented voters) but find mostly hardness results. Yang
and Wang [208] give an overview of further parameterized results; however, the concrete
algorithms announced in this paper are not published. Further fixed-parameter tractabil-
ity results have also been obtained by Bredereck et al. [47]; these results apply to the
more general setting of OWA voting rules.
To conclude, let us report on a positive result for MAV: MAV can be computed in
time O(d2d), where d is the optimal MAV-score, as shown by Misra et al. [151].25 This
runtime is essentially optimal subject to a standard complexity theoretic assumption [70].
6.1.4 Algorithms for Structured Domains
The fourth and final algorithmic technique is to consider structured preference domains.
Here, the assumption is that preferences are not arbitrary but satisfy structural conditions.
We refer the interested reader to a survey by Elkind et al. [85] that discusses this topic more
broadly. For our purpose here, we would like to discuss only two restrictions: candidate
and voter interval (defined in [82], based on previous work [75, 92, 140]), but we note that
many other restrictions exist and have been studied extensively [82, 83, 99, 160, 202, 207].
A profile A belongs to candidate interval (CI) domain if there exists a linear order of
candidates such that for each voter i ∈ N , the set A(i) appears contiguously on the linear
order. Similarly, a profile A belongs to the voter interval (VI) domain if there exists a
linear order of voters such that for each voter c ∈ C, the set N(c) appears contiguously
on the linear order. The CI domain is closely related to the single-peaked domain for
arbitrary ordinal preferences and the VI domain closely related to the single-crossing
domain; this is analyzed in more detail by Elkind and Lackner [82].
Under the assumption that preferences belong either to the CI or VI domain, the
computational complexity can change dramatically: MAV is solvable in polynomial time
if the given approval profile belongs either to the CI or VI domain [142]. Further, Thiele
methods [163] and Monroe’s rule [29] can be solved in polynomial time if the given approval
profile belongs to the CI domain. It remains an open problem whether the same holds
for the VI domain.
25Misra et al. [151] claimed that the runtime of their algorithm is dd; this was corrected later [70, 142].
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6.2 The Algorithmic Perspective of Proportionality
In this section, we briefly review the literature that deals with the computational problem
of finding a proportional committee.
6.2.1 Finding Proportional Committees for Cohesive Groups
We first look at the proportionality concepts that formalize the behavior of rules with
respect to cohesive groups of voters; see Section 5.2.
Note that even the problem of deciding whether in a given instance of election there
exists an ℓ-cohesive group of voters is NP-complete [194]. Similarly, given a committee
W deciding whether W satisfies the EJR condition is coNP-complete [14]; the same holds
for the problem of deciding whether W satisfies the PJR condition [15]. Checking if a
given committee W satisfies JR is computationally easy—for each candidate one needs
to check whether the group of voters approving this candidate is 1-cohesive, and if so,
to check if less than n/k voters from such a group are left without a representative in W .
Checking whether a given committee satisfies perfect representation (Definition 17) is also
computationally easy—the problem reduces to finding a perfect constrained matching in
a bipartite graph [182].
While the problem of checking if a given committee satisfies the EJR/PJR condition is
computationally hard, for a given election instance one can find in polynomial time some
committee that satisfies the two conditions (e.g., through Rule X [164], or through a local-
search algorithm for PAV [15]). The situation is quite different for perfect representation
(PR): it is NP-complete to check whether there exists a PR committee for a given election
instance [182]. Consequently, unless P = NP, there exists no polynomial-time ABC rule
that satisfies perfect representation.
6.2.2 Finding Committees with Attribute-Level Constraints
Next, we move to the model with external attribute-level constraints from Section 5.7.
We start by considering the model from Example 26, where we have a set of voters
with approval-based preferences over the candidates, the candidates have attribute val-
ues (the attributes can be, e.g., gender, age group, education level, etc.) and for each
attribute value we are given quotas specifying upper- and lower- limits on the number of
committee members with this particular attribute value. Two recent works [45, 59] con-
sidered algorithmic aspects of the problem of finding committees maximizing the score
according to a given Thiele method, subject to given attribute-level constraints. The
authors considered the problem from the perspective of approximation algorithms and
parameterized complexity theory, as well as considered variants of the problem, where
the attribute-level constraints have certain special structures. We do not describe their
results in detail, but it is worth mentioning that the problem is computationally hard
even when there are no voters, and the question boils down to finding a committee satis-
fying the attribute-level constraints. The (approximation and fixed-parameter tractable)
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algorithms for this simpler setting were studied by Lang and Skowron [130].
A very similar model to the one from Example 26 is the one of constrained approval
voting (CAP) [33, 171]. The main difference is that, there, the constraints are formulated
for combinations of attributes. For example, a constrain can have the following form: “the
proportion of young (Y) males (M) with higher education (H) in the committee should
not exceed 14%”. Specifically, Brams [33], Potthoff [171] suggest to pick the committee
that maximizes the AV score subject to the aforementioned combinatorial constraints.
A simple translation of CAP into an ILP problem was given by Straszak et al. [197].
However, the setting of constrained approval voting has not been thoroughly studied in
its full generality, and the model is fairly unexplored from the computational perspective.
We conclude this section by discussing two related lines of research. The computational
problem of finding a committee subject to attribute-level constraints is related to the
multidimensional knapsack problem (the main difference is that in the multidimensional
knapsack the candidates can contribute more than a unit weight to each attribute-level
constraint) and to the generic problem of optimizing a submodular function subject to
constraints (see, e.g., [123]). However, this literature usually deals with more general
types of constraints, while the literature we discussed before often provides more dedicated
solutions.
6.3 The Algorithmic Perspective of Strategic Voting
Other types of computational problems arise when one analyzes how the results of ABC
elections change in response to changes in voters’ preferences. There are several reasons
to study this type of computational problems, and we briefly summarize them below.
Historically, the first motivation was to use the computational complexity as a shield
protecting elections from strategic manipulations—the reasoning was the following: if we
cannot construct a good rule that would be strategy-proof (e.g., due to known impossi-
bility theorems; cf. Section 5.6), then we could at least aim at proposing a rule for which
it is computationally hard for a voter to come up with a successful strategic manipula-
tion. This motivation originated in the context o single-winner elections, and was first
proposed by Bartholdi et al. [22]; it was later contested since the analysis of computa-
tional complexity is worst-case in spirit—even for rules for which the problem of finding
a successful strategic manipulation is NP-hard, such manipulations can be found easily
in average case, in particular for many real-life preference profiles (for a more detailed
discussion of these arguments, but with a focus on single-winner elections, we refer the
reader to a survey by Faliszewski and Procaccia [91] and a book by Meir [147]).
Nonetheless, problems related to finding strategic manipulations have various connec-
tions to other important questions. Examples are the question of whether one can stop
eliciting preferences and safely determine the winners of an election, deciding whether the
result of an election is robust to small changes in the given preference profile [103], and
measuring the success of individual candidates in a committee election [94].
Before we move further, we note that for the case of selecting a single winner (k = 1)
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under approval-based preferences, an excellent overview of computational issues related
to strategic voting is given by Baumeister et al. [24]. Thus, in the remaining part of this
section we focus on the literature that deals with the case when k > 1.
6.3.1 Computational Complexity of Manipulation
We first consider the computational problem of finding a successful manipulation. Recall
that we write A+X to denote the profile A with one additional voter approving X , i.e.,
A+X = (A(1), . . . , A(n), X).
Definition 24. Consider an ABC rule R. In the Utility-Manipulation problem we
are given an election instance (A, k), a utility function u : C → R, and a threshold value
t ∈ R. We ask whether there exists an additional ballot X ⊆ C such that
∑
c∈W u(c) ≥ t,
where W ∈ R(A+X , k).
In Subset-Manipulation we are given an election (A, k), a subset of candidates
L ⊆ C, and a positive integer r. We ask whether there exists a profile A′ that extends A
by r additional voters such that L ⊆W for some W ∈ R(A′, k).
Intuitively, in Utility-Manipulation we have a single manipulator with a utility
function describing her level of appreciation for different candidates; the utility function is
additive. The question is whether the manipulator can send an approval ballot such that
she gets the utility of at least t from an elected committee. In Subset-Manipulation
there are r manipulators and their goal is slightly different—they want to ensure that the
candidates from a given set L are all selected. For r = 1 Subset-Manipulation can be
represented as Utility-Manipulation: we assign the utility of one to the candidates
from L and the utility of zero to the other candidates, and set t = |L|. Observe that
it makes sense to consider Utility-Manipulation also in the context of AV—this is
because AV is strategy-proof only for dichotomous preferences, while the definition of
Utility-Manipulation assumes the manipulator has more fine-grained preferences.
Meir et al. [148] have shown that Utility-Manipulation is solvable in polynomial
time for Multi-Winner Approval Voting with adversarial tie-breaking26. Baumeister et al.
[25] proved that also Subset-Manipulation is solvable in polynomial time for AV. Aziz
et al. [13] have shown that Utility-Manipulation is computationally hard for SAV
and PAV with a given tie-breaking order on candidates. They have also proved that
Subset-Manipulation is NP-hard for SAV and coNP-hard for PAV. Further, for PAV
the problem stays hard even if there is only a single manipulator (r = 1), while for SAV
with a single manipulator the problem becomes computable in polynomial time.
Bredereck et al. [44] studied a more general version of Utility-Manipulation, where
the goal is to check whether there exists a coalition of voters that could jointly perform
a successful manipulation. The authors focused on the ℓ-Bloc rule, which is a variant of
Multi-Winner Approval Voting, where each voter approves exactly ℓ candidates. Then,
26Adversarial tie-breaking means that ties between candidates are broken in disfavor of the manipula-
tors.
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the coalition-manipulation problem is computationally hard in its all variants studied by
the authors. On the other hand, if we look at an egalitarian version of ℓ-Bloc (maximizing
the AV-score of the worst-off voter), then the problem becomes computationally tractable.
Another problem related toUtility-Manipulation has been considered by Barrot et al.
[20]: given utility functions of all voters, is there an approval profile consistent with the
utility functions in which a given committee wins.
6.3.2 Computational Complexity of Robustness
The next computational problem that we look at is Robustness. In the definition
below, we consider the following three operations: the operation Add consists in adding a
candidate to the approval set of some voter, Remove deletes a candidate from the approval
set of a voter, and Swap is a combination of Add and Remove applied simultaneously to
the approval set of a single voter.
Definition 25. Consider an ABC rule R and an operation Op ∈ {Add,Remove, Swap}.
In the Op-Robustness problem we are given an election instance (A, k) and an integer b.
We ask whether there exist a sequence S of b operations of type Op such that R(A, k) 6=
R(A′, k), where A′ is the preference profile obtained from A by applying the operations
from sequence S.
Gawron and Faliszewski [103] have shown that the Op-Robustness problem is com-
putationally hard for PAV and CC, for each type of the three operations. On the other
hand, the problem can be solved in polynomial time for AV and SAV. The authors also
computed the robustness radius—a measure that says how much the result of an election
can change in response to a single change in the preference profile—for several ABC rules.
Gawron and Faliszewski [103] and Misra and Sonar [150] also considered the parameter-
ized complexity of the Robustness problem, and have designed several parameterized
algorithms for natural parameters, such as the number of voters n and the number of can-
didates m. Faliszewski et al. [94] considered a similar problem, but they asked whether,
through a sequence of operations of a given type, one can make a particular candidate a
member of a winning committee.
6.4 Open Problems
Also from a computational point of view, many questions concerning ABC rules remain
unanswered:
• Sequential PAV approximates the optimal PAV-score by a factor of at least 1 − 1
e
.
What is the factor for Reverse Sequential PAV? Is it better? The same question can
be asked for CC.
• Several approximation algorithms and heuristics exist for PAV, such as seq-PAV, rev-
seq-PAV, the approximation algorithm based on dependent rounding ([55], discussed
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in Section 6.1.2), and a local-search algorithm used for finding EJR committees
in polynomial time [15]. The difference between these algorithms has not been
investigated from a practical point of view. The main question is which of these
algorithms such be chosen to approximate PAV given a very large election?
• Is it possible to compute Thiele methods and Monroe’s rule in polynomial time if
the given preference profile belongs to the voter interval (VI) domain [82]?
• Often, voting rules have to be computed given incomplete information (such as
missing ballots or incomplete ballots). This problem has not been studied from a
computational point of view for ABC rules, but received substantial attention in
the single-winner literature [31]. One open question in particular is which of the
algorithmic approaches discussed in Section 6.1 can be generalized to this setting.
• The computation of some polynomial-time ABC rules can clearly be parallelized.
For example, for AV each candidate can be processed independently of others. The
framework of P-completeness [106] can be used to determine which ABC rules are
inherently sequential (by showing P-completeness) and which can be parallelized
(by showing, e.g., NL-containment). Such work has been done for single-winner
rules [42, 68, 69] but not for multiwinner rules.
7  Related Formalisms and Applications
In this section, we briefly discuss connections of approval-based committee voting with a
number of other formalisms.
7.1 Multiwinner Voting for Other Types of Votes
In this survey we consider the variant of the committee election model where agents
vote by specifying sets of approved candidates. Several recent works study (mostly from
an algorithmic point of view) an extended variant of this model, where the ballots are
trichotomous, that is where each voter can approve, disapprove or remain neutral with
regard to a candidate. Zhou et al. [210] focuses on CC, PAV, and SAV, and generalize
these rules to trichotomous votes; Baumeister and Dennisen [23] and Baumeister et al.
[25] focus on AV and MAV. Baumeister et al. [26] further extend MAV to the case where
each voter assigns each candidate to one of ℓ predefined buckets, where ℓ is a parameter.
Another classic multiwinner election model is when the voters vote by ranking the
candidates from the most to the least preferred one. The recent survey by Faliszewski et al.
[93] provides an up-to-date overview of the literature on multiwinner election with ranking-
based preferences. The variant where the voters submit weak orders over candidates (i.e.,
rankings with ties) has been considered, e.g., by Aziz and Lee [10]. While multiwinner
voting based on weak orders generalizes both the ABC model of this survey and ranking-
based multiwinner elections, it should be noted that the concepts introduced in this survey
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(e.g., notions of proportionality) do not easily generalize to this more expressive setting,
in particular not without a substantial increase in required notation.
7.2 Multiwinner Voting with a Variable Number of Winners
Throughout this paper, we assume that the committee size is fixed. In the literature on
multiwinner voting with a variable number of winners [116], this assumption is dropped
and a voting rule can return an arbitrary number of candidates—depending on the given
election instance. This question has been first considered by Kilgour [114, 116], and
later from a computational point of view by Faliszewski et al. [95]. The special case of
shortlisting rules has been analyzed by Lackner and Maly [125]. Finally, we note that
so-called social dichotomy functions [39, 79] are largely equivalent to multiwinner rules
with a variable number of winners.
7.3 Participatory Budgeting
In participatory budgeting (PB), we assume that candidates come with different costs, and
that the sum of the costs of the selected candidates cannot exceed a given budget. Thus,
committee elections can be viewed as a special case of participatory budgeting, where the
costs of the candidates are all equal. Typically, candidates correspond to projects in this
setting that require a certain amount of money to be funded. For an overview of different
models and approaches to participatory budgeting, we refer the reader to a recent survey
by Aziz and Shah [12].
Given that in PB the costs of different candidates can vary significantly, it seems
natural to assume that the voters’ preferences are fine-grained. Nevertheless, some of
works [17, 105, 200] study approval-based voting rules for PB, which include rules used
in practice. Knapsack voting suggested by [105] closely resembles AV. Aziz et al. [17]
generalize PAV, seq-Phragme´n, and CC to the case where the candidates can have ar-
bitrary costs, and provide a taxonomy of axioms aimed at formalizing proportionality;
those axioms are adaptations of JR and PJR, which we discuss in Section 5.2. Talmon
and Faliszewski [200] study other axioms, mostly pertaining to different forms of mono-
tonicity (cf. Sections 4.3 and 4.4) and through experiments provide visualizations of the
kind of committees returned by different participatory budgeting rules.
7.4 Budget Division and Probabilistic Social Choice
The goal of a probabilistic social choice function is to divide a single unit of a global
resource between the candidates. Thus, committee elections can be viewed as instances
of probabilistic social choice with the additional requirement that each candidate gets
either 1/k-th fraction of the global resource, or nothing. For an overview of recent results
on probabilistic social choice functions, we refer to a book chapter by Brandt [41],
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Several works [18, 30, 40, 78, 89, 149] study probabilistic social choice functions for
approval votes. The particular focus of some of these works is put on formalizing the
concepts of fairness and proportionality. Some of these concepts closely resemble the ones
that we discussed in the context of approval-based committee elections (Section 5). For
example, Aziz et al. [18] and Fain et al. [89] study the concept of the core (Section 5.4),
Aziz et al. [18] additionally consider the axioms of average fair share, group fair share, and
individual fair share—the properties that closely resemble—respectively—proportionality
degree, PJR, and JR (Section 5.2), Michorzewski et al. [149] show the relation between
these fairness properties and the utilitarian welfares of outcomes (cf. Section 5.5.2). Bo-
gomolnaia et al. [30] focuses on mechanisms which are strategyproof, and Duddy [78]
proves that strategyproofness is incompatible with certain forms of proportionality—an
impossibility result similar to the ones that we discuss in Section 5.6.
7.5 Voting in Combinatorial Domains
Multiwinner election rules output fixed-size subsets of available candidates. An alternative
way of thinking of such rules is that (1) for each candidate c they make a decision whether
c should be selected to the winning committee or not, and (2) there is a constraint which
specifies that exactly k decisions must be positive. Thus, with m candidates there are
m dependent binary decisions (each decision is of the form “include a candidate in the
winning committee or not”) that are made by a multiwinner rule. These decisions are
dependent (related) because of the constraint on the number of positive decisions.
The literature on voting in combinatorial domains studies a general setup, where a
number of decisions (not necessarily binary) need to be made, and where there exist (pos-
sibly complex) relations between the decisions. Similarly, the preferences of the voters
might have complex forms. For example, consider two issues—I1 with two possible deci-
sions Y1 and N1, and I2 with possible decisions Y2 and N2. A voter might prefer decision
Y2 only if the decision with respect to issue I1 is Y1; otherwise, that is if decision N1
on I1 is made, a voter might prefer N2 over Y2 (see [32] for a detailed discussion of this
example). Various languages have been studied that allow voters to express such com-
plex combinatorial preferences. For example, in the context of approval-based committee
elections, some of these languages would allow voters to express the view that a certain
group of candidates works particularly well together, so they should either be all selected
as members of the winning committee or none of them should be chosen, or the view
that some candidates should never be chosen together. In the literature on committee
elections, on the other hand, it is assumed that the preferences of the voters are separable,
thus the voters can only make statements about their levels of appreciation for different
candidates.
For an overview of the literature on voting in combinatorial domains, we refer to a book
chapter by Lang and Xia [131]. Here, we mention three works from this literature that
deal with models particularly related to the model of approval-based committee elections.
In public decision making [67] the decisions are not related, the preferences of the voters
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with respect to decisions on various issues are separable, thus the model closely resembles
the one studied in this survey. The main difference is that in the model for public decisions
there is no constraint specifying the number of decisions that can be positive. There, the
authors focus on designing fair (i.e., proportional) rules. The model of sub-committee
elections [9] generalizes the ones of multiwinner elections and public decisions. There, it
is assumed that the set of candidates is partitioned and for each group of candidates there
is a threshold bounding the number of candidates selected from this group.
Another formalism closely related to ABC voting is perpetual voting [124]. Here,
instead of a committee we have time steps and in each step one candidate is selected.
Consequently, after k rounds k candidates are selected, which can be viewed as a com-
mittee. The main difference is that the set of available candidates and voters’ preferences
can change each round. The goal is to provide proportionality over time, which requires
that the decision in round k is made under consideration of the voters’ satisfaction in pre-
vious rounds. This formalism can be viewed as a special case of voting in combinatorial
domains (with a very specific sequentiality constraint). Further, due to the sequential
structure imposed by time, perpetual voting rules have close connections with commit-
tee monotonic ABC rules (such as seq-Phragme´n and seq-PAV). Similar questions in a
utility-based model have been studied in on- [101] and offline [67] settings.
7.6 Judgment Aggregation and Propositional Belief Merging
In judgment aggregation, we are given a set of logical propositions and a set of voters
providing true/false valuations for these propositions; the goal is to find a collective con-
sistent valuation. Sometimes it is also required that the collective valuation must be
consistent with exogenous logical constraints. Committee elections can be represented as
instances of judgment aggregation, where for each candidate we have a single Boolean
variable representing whether the candidate is elected or not; the exogenous constraints
can be used to enforce that exactly k from these variables are set true, as discussed in
Section 7.5. A chapter by Endriss [86] in the Handbook of Computational Social Choice
discusses this framework in detail and reviews rules for judgment aggregation; see also
the survey by List and Puppe [141].
Propositional belief merging [119–121] is a very general framework, which allows agents
to aggregate their individual positions (beliefs, preferences, judgments, goals) on a set
of issues. Also here this combined, collective outcome has to satisfy given exogenous
logical constraints. Approval-based committee voting can be seen as a special case of
propositional belief merging, although the focus of these two directions of research has
little overlap: belief merging operators are analyzed with respect to a set of postulates
that only partially reflect desiderata in a voting context. A few works have made an
explicit effort to connect voting and belief merging: A particular focus has been the study
of belief merging and strategyproofness [64, 88, 108]. Further, Haret et al. [109] consider
classic axioms from social choice theory in the context of belief merging. Finally, Haret
et al. [110] introduce and analyze proportional belief merging operators.
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7.7 Proportional Rankings
The theory of committee elections can be applied in a seemingly unrelated setting, where
the goal is to find a ranking of candidates based on voters’ preferences. One can observe
that every committee monotonic (Definition 4), resolute ABC rule R can be used to
obtain a ranking of candidates: we put in the first position in the ranking the candidate
that R returns for k = 1; call this candidate c. Committee monotonicity guarantees that
the set of two candidates returned by R for k = 2 contains c; the other candidate is put
in the second position in the ranking, etc.
In particular, if we use a proportional committee-monotonic rule (for example, seq-
Phragme´n or seq-PAV) then the obtained ranking will proportionally reflect the views of
the voters in the sense that each prefix of such a ranking, viewed as a committee, will be
proportional; this idea has been studied in detail by Skowron et al. [193]. Proportional
rankings are desirable, e.g., when one wants to provide a list of recommendations or search
results that accommodate different types of users (cf. diversifying search results [76, 183]),
or in the context of liquid democracy [28], where an ordered list of proposals is presented
to voters for their consideration.
8  Outlook
This section does not exist yet.
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A  Additional Proofs
In this section, we provide some proofs and counterexamples that we were not able to
find in the published literature.
Proposition A.1. AV, PAV, and SAV satisfy strong Pareto efficiency; CC and MAV fail
strong Pareto efficiency.
Proof. Observe that if W1 dominates W2 then the AV-, PAV-, and SAV-score of W1 is
strictly larger than that ofW2. Thus, W2 is not a winning committee for these ABC rules.
To see that CC fails strong Pareto efficiency, consider consider the approval profile
1× {a, c, d} 1× {b, c, d}
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For k = 2, {a, b} is a winning committee even though it is dominated by {c, d}.
To see that MAV fails strong Pareto efficiency, consider consider the approval profile
1× {a, c} 1× {b, c} 1× {d, e}
For k = 1, there is always one voter with Hamming distance 3 to any size-1 committee.
Consequently, all size-1 committees are winning even though {c} dominates {a} and
{b}.
Proposition A.2. CC, PAV, Monroe, Greedy Monroe, lexmin-Phragme´n, Rule X, and
MAV do not satisfy committee monotonicity.
Proof. First, let us consider the approval profile
2× {a} 3× {a, c} 3× {b, c} 2× {c},
CC, PAV, Monroe, lexmin-Phragme´n, and MAV choose {c} for k = 1 and {a, b} for k = 2.
For Greedy Monroe, consider the approval profile A defined as
A(1) = · · · = A(6) = {a}, A(7) = · · · = A(10) = {a, c}, A(11) = A(12) = {a, b, c}
A(13) = A(14) = {a}, A(15) = {a, d}, A(16) = · · · = A(18) = {b, d}.
We assume that Monroe breaks ties between candidates in alphabetic order and between
voters in increasing order. For k = 2 groups have a size of 9, for k = 3 groups have a
size of 6. Now, for k = 2, Greedy Monroe first chooses a and assigns voters 1–9 and then
candidate b assigning voters {11, 12, 16, 17, 18}. For k = 3, Greedy Monroe first chooses
a and assigns voters 1–6, then candidate c assigning voters 7–12, and finally candidate d
assigning voters 15–18. We see that {a, b} is not a subset of {a, c, d}.
For Rule X, consider
4× {a, c} 2× {a, d} 3× {b, d} 1× {b},
For k = 2, the budget of voters is 0.2. Candidate a is selected in the first round, reducing
the budget of voters 1–6 to 1/30. The remaining budget is insufficient to pay for another
candidate, so Phase 2 starts. Now, candidate b is selected via seq-Phragme´n.
For k = 3, the budget of voters is 0.3. Candidate a is selected in the first round,
reducing the budget of voters 1–6 to 0.3 − 1/6 = 2/15. Next, b would be affordable for
q = 0.25, but d is cheaper for q = 11/45. The third candidate is selected in Phase 2.
Here candidate c is selected: voters 1–4 just need an additional budget of 7/60 (since
4 · (2/15+ 7/60) = 1).
We see that Rule X selects {a, b} and {a, c, d} and is thus not committee monotone.
Proposition A.3. Thiele methods and SAV satisfy support monotonicity with addi-
tional voters, seq-PAV, rev-seq-PAV, seq-Phragme´n, and lexmin-Phragme´n satisfy can-
didate monotonicity with additional voters. Further, seq-Phragme´n and lexmin-Phragme´n
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do not satisfy support monotonicity with additional voters, and Monroe, Greedy Monroe,
and Rule X fail candidate monotonicity with additional voters.
AV and SAV satisfy support monotonicity without additional voters, PAV, CC, seq-
PAV, rev-seq-PAV, Monroe, seq-Phragme´n, and lexmin-Phragme´n satisfy candidate mono-
tonicity without additional voters; none of these satisfy support monotonicity without ad-
ditional voters.
Proof. Support monotonicity with additional voters: Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez and Fis-
teus [180] show that Thiele methods and SAV satisfy support monotonicity with additional
voters (referred to support monotonicity with population increase in this paper). Janson
[112] proves that seq-PAV, rev-seq-PAV, and seq-Phragme´n satisfy candidate monotonic-
ity with additional voters. Further, lexmin-Phragme´n satisfy candidate monotonicity with
additional voters; this is a consequence that it satisfies weak support monotonicity with
population increase [180]. A counterexamples showing that seq-Phragme´n does not sat-
isfy support monotonicity with additional voters can be found in [112, 153]. Further,
counterexamples for lexmin-Phragme´n and Monroe can be found in [180].
To see that Greedy Monroe fails candidate monotonicity with additional voters, con-
sider the following election instance: profile with 9 votes and 8 candidates:
1× {b, c, d} 1× {a, c, f} 1× {a, d, e} 1× {c, e}
1× {a, b} 2× {d, f} 1× {b, e} 1× {b, f}
For k = 3, the winning committee according to Greedy Monroe is {b, e, f}. If an additional
voter approves {e}, the winning committees changes to {b, c, d}. This committee does not
contain e and hence Greedy Monroe fails candidate monotonicity with additional voters.
To see that Rule X fails candidate monotonicity with additional voters. Consider
1× {b, d} 1× {a, b} 1× {b, d, e} 1× {a, e}
2× {c, d, e}1× {c, e} 1× {a, c, e} 1× {b, c, d}
For k = 3, the winning committee according to Rule X is {a, d, e}. If an additional voter
approves {a}, the winning committee changes to {b, c, e}. As this committee does not
contain a, Rule X fails candidate monotonicity with additional voters.
Support monotonicity without additional voters: AV and SAV satisfy support
monotonicity without additional voters [180]. PAV, CC, seq-PAV, rev-seq-PAV, Monroe,
seq-Phragme´n, and lexmin-Phragme´n satisfy candidate monotonicity without additional
voters [112, 180]. Counterexamples that these rules do not satisfy the stronger axiom can
be found in [112] for seq-Phragme´n, in [180] for PAV, CC, Monroe, and lexmin-Phragme´n.
For seq-PAV, consider
1× {b, c} 1× {b, d} 1× {e, f} 2× {a, e}
1× {c, f} 1× {a, b} 1× {b, f}
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For k = 3, the winning committee according to seq-PAV is {b, e, f}. If the first voters
changes her ballot from {b, c} to {b, c, e, f}, there are two possible winning committees
(depending on the chosen tiebreaking): {a, b, f} and {b, e, f}. As the first one does not
contain e, seq-PAV fails support monotonicity without additional voters.
For rev-seq-PAV, consider
2× {a, e} 2× {b, c, d} 1× {d, e} 3× {c, e} 1× {b, d, e}
1× {a, b, c} 1× {c, d, e} 2× {a, d, e} 1× {b, d} 1× {a, b}
1× {a, d} 1× {a, b, d} 1× {b, c}
For k = 3, the winning committee according to rev-seq-PAV is {c, d, e}. If the first voter
changes her ballot from {a, e} to {a, c, d, e}, the winning committee changes to {b, d, e}.
As this committee does not contain c, rev-seq-PAV fails support monotonicity without
additional voters.
Proposition A.4. AV with fixed tie-breaking order on candidates satisfies cardinality-
strategyproofness and thus inclusion-strategyproofness. PAV, seq-PAV, seq-CC, rev-seq-
PAV, Monroe, Greedy Monroe, seq-Phragme´n. Rule X, MAV, and SAV do not satisfy
inclusion-strategyproofness.
Proof. To see that AV satisfies cardinality-strategyproofness, consider a fixed voter i.
Observe that if i disapproves one of the (truly) approved candidates, say c, then it may
cause at most one additional candidate get to the winning committee; however, this will
happen only if c is removed from the winning committee. In such case, the satisfaction of
i cannot increase. If i approves a not-yet approved candidate, then this might only cause
this candidate replace some other candidate in the committee. Again, such a change
cannot increase the satisfaction of the voter. Finally, a voter changing his ballot can
be decomposed into a sequence of changes which consists in either approving a disliked
candidate or disapproving a candidate that is actually liked. Each such a change cannot
increase the satisfaction of the voter.
For SAV consider the following profile with 2 votes and 5 candidates:
1× {a, b, c} 1× {d, e}
For k = 1 the winning committees according to SAV are {d} and {e}. If the first voter
changes her ballot to {a}, the winning committee will change to {a}, an outcome which
is preferred by the first voter.
For revseq-PAV consider the following profile with 5 votes and 6 candidates:
1× {a, b, c} 1× {b, d} 1× {b, c} 1× {a, d, e} 1× {b, e}
For k = 2 the winning committees are {b, d} and {b, e}. If the first voter changes her
ballot from {a, b, c} to {a}, then {a, b} will become the only new winning committee. The
first voter prefers this committee to both {b, d} and {b, e}, thus she has an incentive to
misreport her preferences.
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For seq-Phragme´n consider the following profile with 6 votes and 6 candidates:
1× {a, b, c} 1× {a, b} 1× {b, f} 1× {c, e} 1× {b, e, f} 1× {b, d, f}
For k = 2 the only winning committee is {b, f}. If the first voter changes her ballot from
{a, b, c} to {c}, then the winning committee changes to {b, c}, an outcome that the voter
strictly prefers to the original winning committee.
For seq-PAV consider the following profile with 6 votes and 6 candidates:
1× {a, b} 1× {b, d} 1× {c, f} 1× {a, b, f} 1× {b, f} 1× {b, c}
For k = 3 the unique winning committee is {b, c, f}. The first voter can successfully ma-
nipulate by changing her ballot to {a}—then the winning committee changes to {a, b, f}.
For MAV consider the following profile with 6 votes and 6 candidates:
1× {a, b, c} 1× {b, d} 2× {a, b, e} 1× {a, b, d} 1× {a, b}
For k = 3 the unique winning committee is {a, b, d}. If the first voter changes her ballot
to {c}, then {a, b, c} becomes the only winning committee.
For PAV consider the following profile with 6 votes and 6 candidates:
1× {c, d, e} 1× {a, b} 1× {b, f} 1× {a, c, d} 1× {b, c, f} 1× {c, e, f}
For k = 3 the only winning committee is {b, c, f}. If the first voter submits {e} instead
of {c, d, e}, then {b, c, e} will become the only winning committee.
For Rule X consider the following profile with 6 votes and 6 candidates:
1× {b, c, d} 1× {a, b} 1× {b, d} 1× {c, d} 2× {d, e}
For k = 3 the only winning committee is {b, d, e}. The first voter can successfully manip-
ulate by changing her ballot to {c}—then the winning committee changes to {b, c, d}.
For Greedy Monroe consider the following profile with 4 votes and 6 candidates:
1× {a, b} 1× {a, c, f} 1× {a, c, d} 1× {e, f}
For k = 2 the only winning committee is {a, c}. If the first voter changes her ballot to
{b}, then {a, b} becomes the only winning committee.
For Monroe consider the following profile with 12 votes and 6 candidates:
1× {b, d} 1× {a, b, c} 1× {b, e} 1× {d, e} 1× {e, f} 1× {b, c, e}
1× {c, d, e} 1× {b, c} 2× {a, f} 1× {b, c, d} 1× {a, d}
For k = 3 the only winning committee is {a, b, e}. If the first voter changes her ballot to
{f}, the winning committee changes to {b, d, f}.
For seq-CC consider the following profile with 12 votes and 6 candidates:
1× {b, e, f} 1× {a, b} 1× {d, e, f} 1× {d, e} 1× {b, f} 2× {c, d}
1× {a, b, c} 1× {a, c} 1× {a, b, e} 1× {a, e, f} 1× {b, c, d}
For k = 3 the only winning committee is {a, b, d}. The first voter can successfully manip-
ulate by changing her ballot to {c}—then the winning committee changes to {b, c, e}.
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Proposition A.5. If k divides n, then Greedy Monroe extends the largest remainders
method.
Proof. Consider an apportionment instance with p political parties, C1, . . . , Cp, and let
ni denote the number of votes cast on party Ci. Since n is divisible by k, Greedy Monroe
always tries to assign a candidate to n
k
voters. Observe that:
ni −
n
k
<
⌊
k ·
ni
n
⌋
·
n
k
≤ ni.
Let k1 =
∑p
i=1⌊k ·
ni/n⌋. In the first k1 rounds Greedy Monroe assigns to each party
Ci exactly ⌊k · ni/n⌋ seats. This is consistent with the first phase of the largest remainders
method. During these rounds, whenever Greedy Monroe assigns a seat to a party, it
removes n/k of its supporters. Then, each party Ci is left with less than
n
k
supporters.
Specifically, party Ci is left with the following number of supporters:
ni −
⌊
k ·
ni
n
⌋
·
n
k
=
n
k
(
k ·
ni
n
−
⌊
k ·
ni
n
⌋)
.
Next, Greedy Monroe will assign the remaining seats to the parties in the order of de-
creasing values k · ni/n−⌊k · ni/n⌋, that is, it will proceed exactly as the largest remainders
method.
Proposition A.6. In the general case (when k does not have to divide n), Greedy Monroe
and Monroe do not extend the largest remainders method.
Proof. Consider an apportionment instance with 2 parties with, respectively, 50 votes and
31 votes. Assume the committee size is k = 4. For this instance LRM gives 2 seats to
each party. Greedy Monroe can proceed as follows. It starts by giving the second party a
representative and removing the group of 21 voters. Next it can give 3 representatives to
the first party (depending on tie-breaking). The Monroe rule can also select 3 candidates
from the first party and one candidate from the second party.
Proposition A.7. Greedy Monroe satisfies justified representation (JR).
Proof. Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. [182] show that Greedy Monroe satisfies PJR if k divides
n, hence it also satisfies JR under this condition. However, Greedy Monroe satisfies JR
also without this additional constraint. Assume towards a contradiction that Greedy
Monroe fails JR for the election instance (A, k) and let W be the winning committee
according to Greedy Monroe. As W does not satisfy JR, there exists a group of voters V
of size at least n/k and a candidate c /∈ W approved by all of them. Adding candidate c
would have increased the Monroe score of the committee by at least n/k in all rounds.
Hence, the candidates contained in W also increased the score by at least n/k each. Thus,
W has a Monroe score of n, i.e., all voters have an approved candidate in W , which
implies that JR is satisfied.
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Proposition A.8. An ABC rule cannot satisfy both perfect representation and weak
Pareto efficiency.
Proof. Consider the profile
2× {a, c} 1× {a, c, d} 1× {a, d} 1× {b, d} 3× {b, c}
For k = 2, there is exactly one committee that satisfies perfect representation: W1 =
{a, b}. This committee, however, is dominated by W2 = {c, d}. An ABC rule R satisfies
PR if it exclusively returns committees satisfying PR; hence W1 is the only winning
committee and thus R fails weak Pareto efficiency.
Proposition A.9. The proportionality degree of Rule X is between ℓ−1
2
and ℓ+1
2
. The
proportionality degree of SAV and MAV is 0.
Proof. For SAV fix ℓ ∈ N, set the committee size to k = 2ℓ + 1, and consider the
following profile with m = 2k candidates and n = k voters: the first ℓ voters approve
candidates a1, . . . ak and the next k − ℓ voters approve b1, . . . , bk. SAV will select the
committee {b1, . . . , bk}. The group of the first ℓ voters is ℓ-cohesive, but no voter gets any
representative in the elected committee.
For MAV fix ℓ ∈ N, set the committee size to k = ℓ + 1, and consider the following
profile with m = 4k+1 candidates and n = k voters: the first ℓ voters approve candidates
a1, . . . ak and the next voter approves b1, . . . , b3k+1. MAV will select a k-element subset
of {b1, . . . , b3k+1}. The group of the first ℓ voters is ℓ-cohesive, but no voter gets any
representative in the elected committee.
Finally, we consider Rule X. Since Rule X satisfies EJR [164] and EJR implies a
proportionality degree of at least f(ℓ) = ℓ−1
2
[182], we get the lower-bound. For the
upper bound consider the following instance. Fix ℓ ∈ N. We set n = k = ℓ(ℓ+1)
2
and
m = k + ℓ. The voters are divided into ℓ groups N = N1 ∪ N2 ∪ . . . ∪ Nℓ such that
|Ni| = i for each i ∈ [ℓ]. The set of the first k candidates is also divided into ℓ groups
C = C1 ∪ C2 ∪ . . . ∪ Cℓ such that |Ci| = i for each i ∈ [ℓ]. The set of remaining ℓ
candidates is denoted by A. The voters from Ni approve Ci. Additionally the first voter
from each group Ni approves A. Rule X can select the candidates from Cℓ first. Then
the voters from Nℓ have no money left. Next the candidates from Cℓ−1 are selected, etc.
Consequently, Rule X can return committee C1 ∪ C2 ∪ . . . ∪ Cℓ. Consider the voters who
approve A. They form an ℓ-cohesive group, but the average number of representatives
that they get equals 1 + 2 + . . .+ ℓ = ℓ(ℓ+1)
2
. This completes the proof.
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